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This study examines the twenty-nine capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC) to determine their relative validity. The methodology utilizes a multiple criteria decision-making model to determine the relative validity of each MEU (SOC) capability. The criteria for evaluation included Unified Theater Command requirements, U.S. Marine Corps requirements, and history of MEU (SOC) capability execution. This study ranked the MEU (SOC) capabilities in descending order based upon their overall relative validity. Generally, MEU (SOC) capabilities in the Military Operations Other Than War category were determined to have the highest relative validity, while the capabilities in the Direct Action category were determined to have the highest relative validity, while the capabilities in the Direct Action category had the lowest relative validity. The Marine Corps could find itself in a more resource-constrained environment in the near future, and be forced to make difficult decisions regarding reduction of MEU (SOC) capabilities. In this situation, this study provides an alternative form of analysis useful in determining which capabilities should be deleted from the MEU (SOC) repertoire.

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A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN K. LOVE, MAJ, USMC
B.S., Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1984

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

WHICH OF THE TWENTY-NINE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) CAPABILITIES HAVE THE HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY? by Major John K. Love, USMC, 135 pages.

This study examines the twenty-nine capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) to determine their relative validity. The methodology utilizes a multiple criteria decision-making model to determine the relative validity of each MEU (SOC) capability. The criteria for evaluation included Unified Theater Command requirements, U.S. Marine Corps requirements, MEU (SOC) capability uniqueness, MEU (SOC) capability training requirements, and history of MEU (SOC) capability execution.

This study ranked the MEU (SOC) capabilities in descending order based upon their overall relative validity. Generally, MEU (SOC) capabilities in the Military Operations Other Than War category were determined to have the highest relative validity, while the capabilities in the Direct Action category had the lowest relative validity.

The Marine Corps could find itself in a more resource-constrained environment in the near future, and be forced to make difficult decisions regarding reduction of MEU (SOC) capabilities. In this situation, this study provides an alternative form of analysis useful in determining which capabilities should be deleted from the MEU (SOC) repertoire.

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ACRONYMS

AA	Amphibious Assault
AAV	Assault Amphibious Vehicle
ACF	Air Contingency Force
ACE	Aviation Combat Element
AD	Amphibious Demonstration
APS	Airfield/Port Seizure
AR	Amphibious Raid
ARG	Amphibious ready Group
AW	Amphibious Withdrawal
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)
CE	Command Element
CINC	Commander in Chief
CIO	Counterintelligence Operations
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONUS	Continental United States
CPWMD	Counter-Proliferation of Weapons of mass Destruction
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element

DOD	Department of Defense
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
EAO	(Limited) Expeditionary Airfield Operations
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
FSP	Fire Support Planning
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic
GOPLAT	Gas and Oil Platform
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
IHR	In-Extremis Hostage Recovery
ITG	Initial Terminal Guidance
JEO	JTF Enabling Operations
JTF	Join Task Force
JTT	Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team
LAR	Light Armored Reconnaissance
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Center
MCCLS	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System
MCMP	Marine Corps Master Plan
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit

MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MSSG	MEU Service Support Group
NCA	National Command Authority
NEF	Naval Expeditionary Force
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
PO	Peace Operations
PP&O	Plans, Policies, and Operations (HQMC)
R&S	Reconnaissance and Surveillance
RO	Reinforcement Operations
SDO	Specialized Demolitions Operations
SECDEF	Secretary of defense
SI/EW	Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMU	Special Mission Units
SNCOIC	Staff Non-commissioned Officer-in-Charge
SNO	Sniping Operations
SO	Security Operations
SOC	Special Operations Capable
SOEF	Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities

SOFO	Show of Force Operations
SOTG	Special Operations Training Group
SSPM	Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material
TDO	Tactical Deception Operation
TRAC	TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine (USA)
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
USA	United States Army
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (Maritime)
WCCP	Warfighting Center Concept Publication

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

In 1983, then Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Honorable Mr. Caspar M. Weinburger, directed each military service to review their existing special operations capabilities and develop a plan for achieving the level of special operations capability required to combat both current and future low intensity conflicts and terrorist threats.[1]

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) at the time, General Paul X. Kelley, directed the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (FMFLANT), Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gray, to conduct a study that would assess the Marine Corps' current special operations capabilities and then to develop a plan which would further enhance those capabilities. The planning guidance given to Lieutenant General Gray was to develop these special operations capabilities within the following constraints:

1. Maintain the Marine Corps' amphibious character.
2. Do not duplicate other service's special operations capabilities.
3. Develop capabilities built around the standing Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) structure.[2]

Lieutenant General Gray completed his study in 1984 and concluded the Marine Corps was in a favorable position to conduct special operations missions in a maritime environment based on the premise that:

1. The sea-based forward-deployed characteristics of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), the Marine's smallest MAGTF, offered a unique capability for prompt crisis response.

2. The natural flexibility built into the composition of the MAGTF made it well suited to respond to the flexible response-type missions associated with special operations.

3. The current MAGTF conventional missions were inherently adaptable to special operations missions.

4. The MAU offered the widest range of single-source resources--another characteristic that favored special operations.[3]

In July 1985, General Kelley approved the study, and the first operational concept for what was then called the MAU Special Operations Capable (SOC) was written by Lieutenant General Gray. This document identified eighteen special operations missions which the MAU (SOC)s would be capable of performing, beyond their conventional missions, in order to combat low intensity conflict and terrorism. The concept focused on the development, documentation, and enhancement of the skills necessary to conduct select maritime special operations within the MAU.[4] Doctrinally, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico, Virginia, spearheaded the publication of *MAGTF Warfighting Center Concept Publication Number 8-1 (WCCP 8-1)*, which focused on the methodology for institutionalizing the MAU (SOC) concept, "to be used in the formulation of training, organizational, doctrinal, and acquisition programs."[5]

The concept written by Lieutenant General Gray also emphatically stated that the eighteen special operations missions of the MAU (SOC) were merely an enhancement of the traditional conventional missions already resident in the forward-deployed MAU and not intended to transform the MAUs into dedicated special purpose forces. The intent was to enhance the training and equipment within the MAU in order to make them more responsive to a wider range of crises than before. Properly trained and equipped MAU (SOC) forces afloat world-wide would provide the theater unified Commander in Chiefs (CINCs), Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders, and the National Command Authority (NCA) with a greater range of crisis response flexibility than ever before.[6]

Lieutenant General Gray emphasized that although the MAU (SOC)s would possess select maritime special operations capabilities, they were to remain a general purpose force, not a dedicated special purpose force. This is significant because during the same timeframe Congress enacted the Cohen-Nunn Amendment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which established the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Once activated, USSOCOM would exercise combatant command over all special operations forces.[7] If the MAU (SOC)s were to become special operations forces, they would fall under the operational purview of USSOCOM, which would severely inhibit their ability to perform the conventional missions necessary to support the theater CINCs. As a result, the Marine Corps developed a relationship with USSOCOM that enabled the MAU (SOC)s to routinely work with USSOCOM units to compliment, rather than compete with, USSOCOM's roles and functions, while still providing the theater CINC's conventional and special operations capabilities.[8]

In December 1985 the MAU (SOC) Program was officially implemented, and from that point forward MAUs would receive specialized training in order to certify them as SOC before they were to deploy. The Marine Corps Training and Education (T&E) Branch developed a specialized six-month pre-deployment program which was designed to train the MAUs to execute the eighteen special operations missions. This intense training program required progressive individual and unit skills necessary to master the complexities of the new missions. Additionally, the Marine Corps' combat development process was busy acquiring the additional specialized equipment necessary for mission accomplishment. The predeployment training program culminated in an ambitious certification exercise designed to officially designate the unit as SOC, or MAU (SOC). Upon successful completion of the exercise, the MAU (SOC) was ready for world-wide deployment.[9]

In April 1987 Lieutenant General Gray presented the "Operational Concept For Marine Amphibious Units Being Special Operations Capable," which was the first truly definitive paper on the implementation of MAU (SOC) forces. He utilized this paper as a catalyst to aggressively expand the MAU (SOC) program, especially after his promotion and subsequent appointment as the CMC in June of 1987.[10] Soon thereafter, in 1988, the MAU was renamed the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and MEU (SOC)s would continue to deploy world-wide to support theater CINCs until the present day.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Today

Today's MEU (SOC)s are founded upon the MAGTF concept of organizing a Marine ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements under a single command structure to accomplish a specific mission. This self-sustaining combined arms task force, especially when forward-deployed upon naval amphibious shipping, provides the theater CINC or JTF commander unparalleled versatility and flexibility.[11] There is no significant difference in the notional task organization between a MEU and a MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC) is the smallest of the three notional MAGTFs, consisting of approximately 2,200 Marines and Sailors. Figure 1 illustrates the notional task organization of a MEU (SOC).

MEU (SOC) TASK ORGANIZATION



Figure 1.

The Command Element (CE): The MEU (SOC) is commanded by a colonel and provides the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) necessary for effective planning and execution of operations in a joint and combined environment. The CE is a permanent organization comprised of the commander, his staff, and detachments which provide communications, reconnaissance, and liaison support.

The Ground Combat Element (GCE): The GCE is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is built around a conventional infantry battalion consisting of three infantry companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. The battalion is normally reinforced with an artillery battery, a tank platoon, a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) platoon, an Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, and an engineer platoon, and is then referred to as a Battalion Landing Team (BLT).

The Aviation Combat Element (ACE): The ACE is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is built around a medium helicopter squadron reinforced with heavy, attack, and light helicopters, as well as AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft and continental United States (CONUS)-based KC-130 refuelers.

The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE): The CSSE is a multifunctional service support organization called a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) that is organized to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineering, medical and dental, automated information processing, utilities, landing support, disbursing, legal, and postal services to the entire MEU (SOC). The MSSG is also commanded by a lieutenant colonel.[12]

Today, the Marine Corps has seven standing MEU (SOC) headquarters organizations: three in California, three in North Carolina, and one in Okinawa, Japan. The 11th, 13th, and 15th MEU (SOC)s are based in Camp Pendleton, California, one of which is normally deployed in the Western Pacific/Persian Gulf region at any given time. The 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEU (SOC)s are based in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, one of which is normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea region at any given time. The 31st MEU (SOC) is based in Okinawa, Japan, and deploys on a cyclic basis into the Indian Ocean region.[13] Each MEU (SOC) normally deploys for a six-month period, after which it is relieved on station by another MEU (SOC) from its home base.

Today the MEU (SOC)s deploy on a variety of naval amphibious ships. Normally, between three and four amphibious ships are grouped together to form an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). A MEU (SOC) will establish a relationship early in the predeployment training period with the ARG on which they are to embark and will embark on the ARG on several occasions for training exercises before the actual deployment. Once embarked for the six-month deployment, the MEU (SOC) and the ARG are inextricably linked as a Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF). Today the U.S. Navy possesses forty-four amphibious ships organized in nine ARGs.[14]

In the twelve years since the MAU (SOC) program was implemented, several relevant events have occurred. In an attempt to keep the program relevant, the Marine Corps has convened several MEU (SOC) Standardization and Review Conferences throughout the years that have modified the program's missions, training, and equipment requirements. After the MEU (SOC) Standardization and Review Conferences in 1994,

the original eighteen missions were expanded to a total of twenty-one missions and capabilities.[15]

The most recent MEU (SOC) Review Conference occurred in late 1995, during which the conference attendees recommended another expansion of the MEU (SOC)'s capabilities. As a result, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) drafted a change to the Marine Corps Order (MCO) that sets forth policy regarding the MEU (SOC) program. The new order, which the CMC signed into effect in November 1997, now gives the MEU (SOC) one overall mission and combines what were previously termed both missions and capabilities into a total of twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities.[16]

The MEU's basic mission is to "plan for and conduct those conventional and maritime operations assigned by the theater CINC, a Fleet CINC, or a Joint Task Force Commander."[17] The specific mission of the MEU (SOC) is:

> To provide the geographic commanders a forward-deployed, rapid-response capability by conducting conventional amphibious and select maritime special operations under the following conditions: at night; under adverse weather conditions; from over the horizon; under emissions control; from the sea, by surface and/or by air.[18]

The Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The new MCO for MEU (SOC)s divides the inherent capabilities of a forward-deployed MEU (SOC) into four broad categories: Amphibious Operations, Direct Action Operations, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and Supporting Operations. The MEU (SOC) capabilities within each of these categories are listed below and assigned a capability number for further reference. Complete definitions of each MEU (SOC) capability are found in appendix A.

Amphibious Operations

1. Amphibious Assault (AA).
2. Amphibious Raid (AR).
3. Amphibious Demonstration (AD).
4. Amphibious Withdrawal (AW).

Direct Action Operations

5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR).
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF).
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS).
8. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO).
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP).
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM).
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD).

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

12. Peace Operations (PO).
    (a) Peacekeeping.
    (b) Peace Enforcement.
13. Security Operations (SO).
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).
15. Reinforcement Operations (RO).
16. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT).
17. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR).

Supporting Operations

Capabilities which support the full spectrum of MEU (SOC) operations.

18. Tactical Deception Operations (TDO).

19. Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment (FSP).

20. Signal Intelligence /Electronic Warfare (SI/EW).

21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).

22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S).

23. Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG).

24. Counterintelligence Operations (CIO).

25. Airfield/Port Seizure (APS).

26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO).

27. Show of Force Operations (SOFO).

28. JTF Enabling Operations (JEO).

29. Sniping Operations (SNO).[19]

The Problem

Today the MEU (SOC) program is viewed by many within the Department of Defense (DOD) as one of the "Crown Jewels" of the Marine Corps. Much of the Marine Corps' current doctrine and concepts focus on the employment of MAGTFs, and specifically MEU (SOC)s, in supporting the nation's warfighting needs. The current methodology utilized to evaluate MEU (SOC) capabilities is primarily qualitative. As General Krulak stated in a recent letter to me:

> We didn't arrive at this point in history suddenly or without considerable thought and depth of experience. The MEU (SOC) today is the result of a long, evolutionary process driven largely by the subjective analysis of former and current MEU (SOC) commanders and other experienced staff officers; through extensive discussions with the Joint Staff and the CINC's staffs; and after careful analysis of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and other relevant documents.[20]

While I do not question either the validity of this qualitative process or the value of the experience of those who have considerable experience with the MEU (SOC) program, I feel the method of analyzing MEU (SOC) capabilities can be enhanced with a complimentary quantitative analysis process.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis will be to analyze the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities in order to determine their relative validity by applying a quantitative form of analysis. My intent is not to discredit, invalidate, or replace the process used by HQMC to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities, but rather to offer a different perspective based on an innovative form of analysis. This study will be presented to HQMC as a tool to enhance the subjective analysis process used to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities in the future. The quantitative analysis process described herein, and the results of the research conducted, will provide a useful statistical point of departure for members of future MAGTF/MEU standardization and review conferences in much the same way as the "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" process provides important objective information to assist commanders make their final subjective decisions.

Research Question

This thesis seeks to research and answer the following primary question: Which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the highest relative validity? The secondary questions are:

1. Which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the least relative validity?

2. What evaluation criteria should be used to analyze the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities to determine their relative validity?

3. From the perspective of each separate evaluation criteria, which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the highest relative validity?

4. From the perspective of each separate evaluation criteria, which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the least relative validity?

5. Should the Marine Corps add or delete from the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities?

Assumptions

I make the following assumptions while undertaking this research:

1. That over the next five years the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) will remain relatively unchanged.

2. That the fundamental roles and functions assigned to the Marine Corps will remain constant over the next five years.

3. That the missions of the theater CINCs will remain relatively unchanged over the next five years.

4. That the Marine Corps will continue to deploy MEU (SOC)s during the next five years.

5. That MEU (SOC)s will remain as general purpose forces, and therefore fall under the operational control of the theater CINCs vice USSOCOM.

6. That the outcome of the fiscal year 1998 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will not adversely effect the employment of the MEU (SOC) during the next five years.

7. That the model I use to analyze the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities is valid.

Definitions

Although definitions are found in appendix A to this paper, the following definitions are listed here. Validity: well-grounded on principles or evidence; able to withstand criticism or objection, as an argument; sound. Relative validity: the extent to which a MEU (SOC) capability is either more or less valid in relation to the norm, or the MEU (SOC) capability with average validity.

Limitations

While there is an abundance of historical information pertaining to the development of the MEU (SOC) and the evolutionary process of its missions and capabilities, limited documentation exists relating to the methodology used to derive these missions and capabilities. I conducted numerous interviews with the doctrine

writers at HQMC who are trying to answer this same thesis question, but are utilizing a different methodology.

The research methodology as set forth in chapter 3 relies heavily upon surveys and questionnaires to obtain qualitative input from various respondent populations. An inherent weakness in this form of research is the variation of responses that could be expected with different survey populations.

Delimitations

I imposed the following restraints upon this research in order to remain focused:

1. I only analyzed the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities as set forth in Marine Corps Order 3120. 9A, *Policy for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable).*

2. I only analyzed the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities within the five evaluation criteria set forth in chapter 3 of this thesis.

3. The survey I conducted amongst select U.S. military officers on the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, as discuss in chapter 3, was limited to twelve officers.

4. The questionnaire I conducted with staff officers at each theater unified command, as discussed in chapter 3, was limited in scope to the five theater unified commands.

5. The questionnaire I conducted with subject matter experts (SMEs) from other U.S. military units, as discussed in chapter 3, was limited to twelve officers.

6. The questionnaire I conducted with SMEs serving in various MEU oversight positions, as discussed in chapter 3, was limited to seven officers.

7. The research of MEU (SOC) involvement in named operations was limited to the past eight years.

8. This study will remain unclassified by design in order to facilitate its distribution to interested parties.

Significance of the Study

After having discussed my proposed thesis with officers in the MAGTF and Special Operations Section, Plans Policies and Operations (PP&O), HQMC, I am convinced my thesis topic is significant. A similar study or method of analysis of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities has not been conducted.[21-22] My aim is to arrive at a factually-based, logical conclusion that could serve as a recommendation for improving the way the Marine Corps undertakes the critically important task of preparing its MEU (SOC)s to truly meet the operational needs of the combatant commanders, today and tomorrow.

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[2]MCO 3120.9 (1994), 2.

[3]MCO 3120.9 (1994), 3.

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[9]Lawrence D. Nicholson, "An Analysis of the Twenty-one Missions of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)" (Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 48-50.

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[13] Nicholson, (1994), 54.

[14]Staff, "Naval Amphibious Forces," *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 1996) I-1 through I-4.

[15]MCO 3120.9 (1994), 7.

[16]MCO 3120.9A (1997), 11-17.

[17]U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 3120.8A, *Policy for the Organization of Forces for Combat* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1992), 4.

[18]*MCO 3120.9A* (1997), 11.

[19]*MCO 3120.9A (*1997), 11-17.

[20]Charles C. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps General, to author 22 January 1998.

[21]C. H. McGhoey, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, telephonic interviews by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 22, 26 and 27 August 1997.

[22]John M. Stone, U.S. Marine Corps Major, telephonic interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 26 August 1997.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In order to complete this thesis I conducted research in three separate phases. First, research was conducted on the history of the development of the MEU (SOC) program and its capabilities; the results of which are detailed in chapter 1. Next, I conducted research in order to develop and validate a multiple criteria decision-making model; the outcome of which is seen in chapter 3. Finally, research was conducted to gather data and information to conduct the actual analysis of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities, which is set forth in chapter 4.

Literature Review Relating to the History of the MEU (SOC) Program and Its Capabilities

Research conducted during this phase consisted of a review of books, periodicals, and government documents, as well as personal and telephonic interviews. There is an abundance of literature pertaining to the history of the MEU (SOC) program. A review of the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) Database at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, using keywords "Marine Expeditionary Unit" turned up over 600 references. However, information relating to the Marine Corps process for analyzing the MEU (SOC) capabilities is lacking. For this reason I based my historical research on written documents, but founded my research relating to the Marine Corps' method of analyzing the MEU (SOC) capabilities on

personal and telephonic interviews and on a personal letter I received from the CMC, General Krulak, dated 22 January 1998.

The history of the MEU (SOC) program is detailed in many Marine Corps publications and documents, both current and outdated. A review of the MEU (SOC) program's originating documents provided keen insight into the developmental process. One of the primary original documents was a draft concept paper titled, "Operational Concept For Marine Amphibious Units Being Special Operations Capable," published by FMFLANT in April 1987. This draft describes the inception of the MAU (SOC) program concept, and describes how the MAU (SOC) would fit into the role of the Marine Corps. This document also set forth the possible missions for the MAU (SOC), but does not provide insight into the process used to arrive at these missions.

Additional Marine Corps documents proved useful to my historical research. The Marine Corps Warfighting Center Concept Publication (WCCP) 8-1, *Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)*, dated 1990, provided information regarding the initial formulation of training, organizational, doctrinal, and acquisition programs to support the MEU(SOC) program. Marine Corps Order P3000.16, *Operational Policy for Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Special Operations Capable)*, dated 1992, and the *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)* Volume 1, dated 1992, provided information on the concept of MEU (SOC) employment in support of the theater CINCs and the National Command Authority (NCA).

Several Marine Corps documents were reviewed to assess the current status of the MEU (SOC) program. MCO 3120.9A, *Policy For Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)*, dated 1997, provided the current Marine Corps policy regarding

the MEU (SOC) and its missions and capabilities. This order sets forth one overall mission for the MEU (SOC), and the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities that were listed in chapter 1, and analyzed in chapter 4. Additionally, there are multiple articles published recently in magazines, such as the *Marine Corps Gazette, Parameters, U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings,* the *Amphibious Warfare Review*, and the *Naval War College Review*, which amplify the individual MEU (SOC) capabilities.

A search of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College revealed three master's theses and a monopraph written recently which are relevant to my study. While two of the theses address the subject of the Marine Corps' role in joint special operations, the third thesis addresses my specific research question. In his thesis titled, "An Analysis of the Twenty-one Missions of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)," Major Lawrence Nicholson, USMC, sought to determine the validity of the then twenty-one missions of the MEU (SOC) by conducting an opinion survey of 125 Marine Corps majors. All three of these master's theses have dedicated a portion of their research to the historical development of the MEU (SOC) program. However, they do not specifically address the methodology used by the Marine Corps to determine MEU (SOC) capabilities.

During the course of research in this phase I conducted personal and telephonic interviews with eight Marine Corps officers varying in rank from major through colonel. The telephonic interviews I conducted with two officers from HQMC provided significant information pertaining to the Marine Corps' process for analyzing the MEU (SOC) capabilities. The Director of the MAGTF and Special Operations Branch, PP&O, HQMC, provided personal accounts of the past several MEU (SOC) review conferences

during which the MEU (SOC) capabilities were reviewed, and relayed his own important role in the review process. In his current capacity at HQMC, he provided me the latest information and status of the MEU (SOC) program.

Literature Review Relating to Research Conducted to Develop and Validate A Multiple Criteria Decision-Making Model

In order to develop a valid capability analysis model, I conducted a personal interview with Michael R. Anderson, Ph.D., at the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC) on 29 August 1997.[1] Dr. Anderson's expertise is in the development of multiple criteria decision-making models. He guided me through the development of the model outlined in chapter 3 and utilized in chapter 4 to analyze the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. Additionally, he provided me with the following documents which were instrumental to the development of my model: an essay he coauthored titled, "The Research, Development, and Acquisition Alternatives Analyzer: A tool for Addressing the Army's Modernization Program";[2] an article from the *Program Manager* periodical titled, "Quality Force Deployment";[3] and a book titled, *Multiple Attribute Decision Making Methods and Applications*.[4] Although I conducted research to develop a valid and viable model, the model itself is not the intended outcome of this thesis. Rather, the model is only a necessary tool I will use in order to reach my desired outcome, the answer of my thesis question.

Another major portion of research required to develop my analysis model was conducted through the use of an opinion survey, a sample of which is located in appendix B. The literature reviewed consisted of the twelve surveys that were returned, a summary of which is found in appendix C.

Literature Review Relating to Data and Information Required to Analyze the 29 MEU (SOC) Capabilities

The result of my initial opinion survey was the identification of criteria which I used to analyze the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. Once these criteria were identified, I conducted research within each criterion as will be explained in depth in chapters 3 and 4. This research led me to review additional relevant literature.

First, the questionnaire found in appendix D was returned by each of the five Theater Unified Command Deputy J-3s. A summary of this questionnaire is found in Appendix E.

Second, the questionnaire found in appendix F was returned by twelve respondents with considerable experience in other U.S. military units. A summary of this questionnaire is found in appendix G.

Third, the questionnaire found in Appendix H was returned by ten respondents with considerable experience in MEU (SOC) training issues. A summary of this questionnaire is found in appendix I.

Finally, I reviewed an abundance of literature pertaining to MEU (SOC) involvement in nineteen named operations during the past eight years. The latest compact disc from the Warfighting Development Integration Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, contained over 250 Marine Corps Lessons Learned (MCLLS) files pertaining to these operations. I also reviewed over one hundred articles from various military and nonmilitary periodicals that were accessed through the ProQuest on-line search program available at the CARL, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Additionally, I reviewed several documents from the Center for Naval Analyses

(CNA), Alexandria, Virginia, and the Marine Corps Historical Center, History and Museums Division, HQMC, that pertained to recent MEU (SOC) operations.

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[1]Michael R. Anderson, Ph.D. Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC). Personal interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 29 August 1997.

[2]Michael R. Anderson, Ph.D., Scott Donahue, and Richard E.Rosenthal, Ph.D. "The Research, Development, and Acquisition Alternatives Analyzer: A tool for Addressing the Army's Modernization Program" (Essay, n.d.), 1-6.

[3]Miller, Thomas H. "Quality Force Deployment." *Program Manager* (September-October 1990): 32-37.

[4]Ching-Lai Hwang and Yoon Kwangsum. *Multiple Attribute Decision Making Methods and Applications*. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981), 1-67.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology used to conduct this investigation. The methodology used consisted of a series of straightforward steps that organized, analyzed, and interpreted data to answer this paper's proposed research questions. The principle methodology was based on a multiple criteria decision-making model, which "refers to making decisions in the presence of multiple, usually conflicting, criteria."[1] The model was developed with the assistance of Michael R. Anderson, Ph.D., of the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC), who has developed similar models as a tool for addressing the U.S. Army's Modernization Program. The model incorporates a process known as "Simple Additive Weighting," whereby a weighting system using numerical values was used to derive a total value for each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. After the total values were computed for each MEU (SOC) capability, the capabilities were ranked in descending order based on their cumulative point value. The capabilities that received the highest values were deemed to have the highest relative validity, while those on the bottom of the scale were found to have the least relative validity.[2] The MEU (SOC) capabilities ranked at the bottom of the scale were then reviewed in isolation for mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would justify a higher relative validity. "A multiple criteria decision-making problem can be expressed precisely in a matrix format."[3] Therefore, I will utilize a variety of matrices, or tables, to explain my model.

Although this chapter primarily addresses the development of the multiple criteria decision-making model, the model itself is not the intended outcome of this thesis. Rather, the model is only a necessary tool I will use in order to reach my desired outcome, the answer of my thesis questions. Following are the steps I took to develop the model, conduct necessary research, integrate the data collected into the model, analyze the outcome, and then make final conclusions:

Step 1: Determine Evaluation Criteria

The first step in developing the multiple criteria decision-making model was to determine the evaluation criteria by which I would examine each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. This step was the basis of the framework of my model, and therefore must be accepted as valid by the reader of this thesis. "Selection of evaluation criteria is subjective and therefore must be made by the qualitative judgement of subject matter experts."[4] In this case, SMEs were selected from the numerous senior U.S. military officers within the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) who have expertise in the subject of mission and capability analysis. Based upon the recommendations of various department officials within the USACGSC, I identified twelve officers with appropriate credentials.[5-16] Next, I met with each of these officers individually, explained my thesis subject and research methodology, and left them with the opinion survey found in appendix B. The survey was designed to identify evaluation criteria and place the selected criteria into categories of importance.

Of the twelve surveys distributed, all twelve were returned by the cutoff date of 1 December 1997, for a return rate of one hundred percent. Of that number, five

respondents were O-5s and seven were O-6s. Of the twelve respondents, there were three each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. A more detailed respondent profile is found in table 26 in appendix C.

The results of the questionnaires were tabulated and a "cumulative point value" process was used to obtain a ranking of each of the evaluation criteria. The respondents were asked to categorize each criterion based on the importance of that evaluation criterion in relation to the importance of other evaluation criteria selected. The respondents placed each of the evaluation criterion into one of three "Categories of Importance" that were weighted as follows:

1. Evaluation criteria determined to be of "High Importance" received a numerical value of "three."

2. Evaluation criteria determined to be of "Medium Importance" received a numerical value of "two."

3. Evaluation criteria determined to be of "Low Importance" received a numerical value of "one."

The total number of responses in each category were multiplied by the category's value, and then added together to provide a point total. The evaluation criteria were then ranked in descending order based upon their cumulative point values. Table 1 below depicts the "cumulative point value" process used to tabulate the results of the questionnaire to determine the MEU (SOC) capabilities evaluation criteria:

Table 1. Evaluation Criteria Questionnaire Tabulation Process

MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria	Number of Responses in Each Category of Importance (Point Subvalues)			Total Points
	High (Value of 3)	Medium (Value of 2)	Low (Value of 1)	
1. Theater CINC identifies as a needed capability to meet his operational requirements	9 (9X3=27)	3 (3X2=6)	0 (0)	33 (27+6)

The result of this initial survey was the selection of the five evaluation criteria I used to evaluate the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities in chapter 4. In addition to selecting these criteria, each of the criteria were placed into one of three categories of importance, high, medium or low, based upon the results of the survey. The detailed results of the survey are found in Table 27 in Appendix C. Following are the five evaluation criteria and their category of importance:

1. Criterion 1: The Theater CINCs identify the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet their operational requirements. (High Importance.)

2. Criterion 2: The Marine Corps identifies the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet Theater CINC's operational requirements (Medium Importance.)

3. Criterion 3: The capability is unique to the MEU (SOC). (Medium Importance.)

4. Criterion 4: The capability requires training time commensurate with other MEU (SOC) capabilities. (Medium Importance.)

5. Criterion 5: The capability has been executed by a MEU (SOC) during an operation in the past eight years. (Low Importance.)

The final decision in this step was to assign values, or weights, to each of the evaluation criteria. This step was critical in order to conform to the "Simple Additive Weighting" process upon which the model was based. The following numerical values were assigned the "Categories of Importance:"

1. Criterion of "High Importance" received a numerical value of "three."
2. Criteria of "Medium Importance" received a numerical value of "two."
3. Criterion of "Low Importance" received a numerical value of "one."[17]

Table 2 below depicts the final results of step 1:

Table 2. MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria

Categories of Importance				
High Importance (Value of 3)	Medium Importance (Value of 2)			Low Importance (Value of 1)
Criterion 1	Criterion 2	Criterion 3	Criterion 4	Criterion 5
Theater CINCs identify capability to meet their operational requirements	USMC identifies capability to meet CINC's operational requirements	Capability unique to the MEU (SOC)	Training for capability commensurate with training for other capabilities	Capability executed by MEU (SOC) in an operation in past eight years

Step 2: Collect and Analyze Data for Each Evaluation Criteria

After identifying the five evaluation criteria, I then conducted research within each criterion. The research methodology was unique for each of the five evaluation criteria.

For evaluation criteria 1, "The Theater CINCs identify the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet their operational requirements," I determined the need to canvas the

Theater CINCs. However, given the scope of this study and the impracticability of contacting the actual Theater CINCs, I decided to contact a senior U.S. military officer on the Theater CINC's staff whom I thought would be capable of speaking on behalf of the CINC. I conducted a telephonic interview with the Deputy J-3s of each of the five Theater Unified Commands; United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). I followed up the interview with a questionnaire, which can be found in appendix D. The purpose of the interview and the questionnaire was to determine the relative significance of each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements. The results of the research conducted within criterion 1 are shown in appendix E and will be analyzed in chapter 4.

The methodology to research within evaluation criteria 2, "The Marine Corps identifies the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet the Theater CINC's operational requirements," was to conduct an interview with the CMC, General Charles C. Krulak, USMC, while he was visiting the USACGSC, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 14 January 1998. Due to a constrained time schedule, the interview was limited to approximately one minute, during which time I had a brief opportunity to explain my thesis topic and deliver a questionnaire to General Krulak. General Krulak responded with a personal letter dated 22 January 1998, in which he provided valuable insight on the Marine Corps' position regarding the validity of the MEU (SOC) capabilities. The results of the research conducted within criterion 2 will be analyzed in chapter 4.

The research required for evaluation criteria 3, "The capability is unique to the MEU (SOC)," was accomplished by reviewing the capabilities of units from other U.S. military branches that directly support the Theater CINCs. I identified the following types of units that possessed similar capabilities to that of a MEU (SOC): U.S. Army special forces, ranger, airborne, and air assault, units; U.S. Navy conventional and special warfare units; U.S. Air Force special tactics units; USSOCOM's Special Mission Units (SMU); and USMC Air Contingency Forces (ACFs). Next, I identified and conducted an interview with a SME from each of these types of units, at which time I delivered the questionnaire found in appendix F. The results of the research conducted within criterion 3 are displayed in Appendix G and will be analyzed in chapter 4.

To research within evaluation criteria 4, "The capability requires training time commensurate with other MEU (SOC) capabilities," I conducted telephonic interviews with seven Marine Corps officers who were currently serving in one of the following MEU (SOC) oversight positions: MEU action officer at the Marine Forces (component) level; MEU action officer at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level; and deputy director, or operations officers of each of the three Marine Corps Special Operations Training Groups (SOTGs). The SOTG is the organization tasked with developing and coordinating MEU (SOC) special skills training, as well as being the resident expert on all MEU (SOC) special operations training.[18] Once again I followed up the interviews with questionnaires, a copy of which is in appendix H. The purpose of the interview and the questionnaire was to determine the relative training time required for the MEU to attain proficiency in each of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities during the standard six-month MEU (SOC) predeployment training program. The results of the research

conducted within criterion 4 are displayed in appendix I and will be analyzed in chapter 4.

Finally, in order to research within Criteria 5, "The capability has been executed by a MEU (SOC) during an operation in the past eight years," I reviewed the history of MEU (SOC) operations during the past eight years. PP&O, HQMC, maintains a record of Marine Corps involvement in named operations since 1776. I also reviewed over 250 MCCLS reports on these operations, as well as over one hundred related articles from military periodicals. Additionally, I received input from the CNA and the Marine Corps Historical Center, and conducted personal and telephonic interviews with Marine Corps officers who were personally involved in these operations. The results of the research conducted within criterion 5 are displayed in appendix J and will be analyzed in chapter 4.

It is important to explain how the results of the research conducted for each evaluation criterion fits into the multiple criteria decision-making model. The research results within each evaluation were tabulated in such a way that each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities were placed into one of five "Final Categories of Relative Significance"; extreme, high, moderate, low, and least. This process of categorization was necessary for the model development in much the same manner as were the "Categories of Importance" in step 1; so that numerical values could be assigned. As a result, the following values were assigned to the five " Final Categories of Relative Significance:"

1. Capabilities determined to be of "Extreme Relative Significant" received a numerical value of "four."

2. Capabilities determined to be of "High Relative Significant" received a numerical value of "three."

3. Capabilities determined to be of "Moderate Relative Significance" received a numerical value of "two."

4. Capabilities determined to be of "Low Relative Significance" received a numerical value of "one."

5. Capabilities determined to have the "Least Relative Significance" received a numerical value of "zero."[19]

Table 3 below depicts the multiple criteria decision-making model at this point in development and the conclusion of step 2:

Table 3. Basic Multiple Criteria Decision-Making Model

Categories of Relative Significance	Categories of Importance				
	High Importance	Medium Importance			Low Importance
	Criterion #1 (Value of 3)	Criterion #2 (Value of 2)	Criterion #3 (Value of 2)	Criterion #4 (Value of 2)	Criterion #5 (Value of 1)
Extreme (Value of 4)					
High (Value of 3)					
Moderate (Value of 2)					
Low (Value of 1)					
Least (Value of 0)					

Step 3: Analyze Data and Information Obtained Within Each Evaluation Criterion

During this step, the results of the research conducted in step 2 were entered into the model in isolation within each of the five evaluation criterion. By doing so, a numerical subvalue was assigned to each of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities within each of the five evaluation criterion. This was accomplished by multiplying the value of the "Category of Importance" by the value of the "Category of Relative Significance" in which each capability was placed. Table 4 below depicts the process for calculating sub-values for each capability within each of the evaluation criteria:

Table 4. Calculating Subvalues for Each MEU (SOC) Capability

Categories of Relative Significance	Evaluation Criteria 1 The Theater CINCs identify the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet their operational requirements (Value of 3)
Extreme Relative Significance (Value of 4)	MEU (SOC) capabilities determined to be of extreme relative significant after analyzing the results of the Theater Command J-3 questionnaires in Appendix E would be placed here, and receive a subvalue of 12 (4X3)
High Relative Significance (Value of 3)	Capabilities listed here receive a subvalue of 9 (3X3)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	Capabilities listed here receive a subvalue of 6 (2X3)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	Capabilities listed here receive a subvalue of 3 (1X3)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	Capabilities listed here receive a subvalue of 0 (0X3)

Step 4: Combine the Results of the Analysis Conducted in Step 3

During this step I simply added the subvalues of each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities received within each of the five evaluation criteria and determined the total value for each MEU (SOC) capability. Table 5 below depicts the process for calculating the total value for each MEU (SOC) capability:

Table 5. Calculating Total Values for each MEU (SOC) Capability

Categories of Relative Signif-icance	Categories of Importance					Total Value
	High	Medium			Low	
	Criterion #1 (Value of 3)	Criterion #2 (Value of 2)	Criterion #3 (Value of 2)	Criterion #4 (Value of 2)	Criterion #5 (Value of 1)	
Extreme (Value of 4)		Capability "X" = 8 (4X2)				Capability "X" = 23 (9+8+2 +4+0)
High (Value of 3)	Capability "X" = 9 (3X3)					
Moderate (Value of 2)				Capability "X" = 4 (2X2)		
Low (Value of 1)			Capability "X" = 2 (1X2)			
Least (Value of 0)					Capability "X" = 0 (0X1)	

Step 5. Final Analysis

After determining the total values, I ranked the MEU (SOC) capabilities in descending order based on their total value, with the MEU (SOC) capability receiving the highest total value ranked as number one, and the MEU (SOC) capability receiving the lowest total value ranked as number twenty-nine. I then placed the twenty-nine ranked MEU (SOC) capabilities into five "Final Categories of Relative Validity" based upon their total point values and an apportioned scale system.[20] An apportioned scale was calculated by determining the point difference between the highest and lowest total point values, and then dividing that number by five to determine the point scale for each of the five "Final Categories of Relative Significance." The total point values, ranking, apportioned scale, and placement of MEU (SOC) capabilities into each category will be determined in chapter 4. Table 6 below depicts the "Final Categories of Relative Validity."

Table 6. Determining Relative Validity of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Final Category of Relative Validity	Rank	Final Total Value	MEU (SOC) Capability
Extreme Relative Validity	1	Highest Point Total	
High Relative Validity			
Moderate Relative Validity			
Low Relative Validity			
Least Relative Validity	29	Lowest Point Total	

The MEU (SOC) capabilities that were placed in the category of "Least Relative Validity" were further examined for mitigating or extenuating circumstances which might justify a higher final relative validity.

Step 6: Conclusions

Whereas the results of steps 1-5 are addressed primarily in chapter 4 of this thesis, step 6 occurs in chapter 5, the conclusion. In the conclusion I answer the primary and secondary questions of the thesis and present my recommendations for solutions or alternatives.

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[1]Ching-Lai Hwang and Yoon Kwangsum. *Multiple Attribute Decision Making Methods and Applications*. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981), 1.

[2]Hwang and Kwangsum, 99.

[3]Hwang and Kwangsum, 77

[4]Michael R. Anderson, Ph.D. Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC). Personal interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 29 August 1997.

[5]W.D. Brosnan, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, instructor, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 15 October 1997.

[6]Robert Brown, U.S. Navy Commander, Deputy Director, U.S. Navy Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 22 October 1997.

[7]Rex A. Estilow, U.S. Marine Corps Colonel, Director, School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, Va. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 24 October 1997.

[8]Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army Colonel, Director, U.S. Army Battle Command Training Laboratory, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 17 October 1997.

[9]Andrew Giacomini, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Director, U.S. Air Force Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 8 October 1997.

[10]James M. Hawkins, U.S. Marine Corps Colonel, Director, U.S. Marine Corps Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 16 October 1997.

[11]William E. Johns, U.S. Air Force Colonel, Director, U.S. Air Force Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 8 October 1997.

[12]Robert Kennedy, U.S. Navy Commander (Select), instructor, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 21 October 1997.

[13]George Knotzon, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. Chief Instructor, , U.S. Air Force Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 8 October 1997.

[14]Bruce W. Menning, Ph.D, U.S. Army Colonel (Retired), instructor, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 21 October 1997.

[15]Roy A. Merrill, U.S. Navy Captain, Director, U.S. Navy Element, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview conducted by author, Fort. Leavenworth, Ks., 22 October 1997.

[16]Melvin G. Spiese, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, student, Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. Personal interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., 21 August 1997.

[17]Anderson, interview.

[18]U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3502.3, *Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training Program* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1995), 11.

[19]Anderson, interview.

[20]Anderson, interview.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Each of the five evaluation criteria described in chapter 3 will be examined in detail. Included in the discussion of each evaluation criteria will be the results of the unique research requirements for each criterion, and how the results are incorporated into the multiple criteria decision-making model. An explanation will be provided for the unique value weighting process that was used for each of the criteria in order to satisfy the "simple additive weighting" methodology of the model. Next, I will combine the results of each criteria analysis into the model and process the data to produce the final results. Finally, I will examine those MEU (SOC) capabilities that were placed in the category of "Least Relative Validity" for factors which might justify a higher relative validity.

A key point to consider throughout the analysis process is the difficulty encountered when attempting to quantify the extremely subjective issues of the evaluation criteria. The methodology of analysis is based upon the objective process of tabulating and averaging a variety of questionnaires, which are based primarily upon subjective input. Critical to this process is the selection of the appropriate target population for each questionnaire, so their input is accepted as that from true SMEs, and therefore validates the model. As is the case with any survey process, it is highly probable that a different survey population would produce different results. In certain instances there were practical limitations on the selection of the survey target population.

In these cases, focus should remain on the process of the methodology, rather than discrediting the model based on a perceived error in the selection of the survey target population.

Criterion #1: The Theater CINCs Identify the MEU (SOC) Capability as Needed to Meet Their Operational Requirements

This criterion has been determined to be the most important, and therefore the results have the greatest impact on the model's weighting system. Although it is conceived that the Theater CINC's requirements should be the most important factor to consider when analyzing MEU (SOC) capabilities, this study did not obtain actual Theater CINC input. Given the limited scope of the study, there was not a reasonable expectation, nor a perceived appropriateness, to attempt to obtain actual Theater CINC input. Rather, input was received from a survey population targeted at the Deputy Director of Operations (O-6) level. Given the subjective nature of the questionnaire, it is highly likely the actual Theater CINCs would have provided different responses. Telephonic interviews were conducted with the Deputy Directors of Operations of each of the five Theater Unified Commands,[1-5] after which each interviewee was sent the questionnaire found in appendix D. Of the five questionnaires sent, all five were returned for a return rate of one hundred percent. In three cases, follow-up telephonic interviews were required to clarify the respondent's remarks on their questionnaire. Table 29 in appendix E provides a complete respondent profile. Although four of the five respondents were U.S. Marines, this was an unintentional occurrence as I was targeting a particular position on the CINC's staff rather than seeking service-specific respondents.

The results of the questionnaires were tabulated and a "cumulative point value" process was used to obtain a point value for each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. The respondents placed each MEU (SOC) capability into one of five "Categories of Relative Significance" which were weighted as follows:

1. Capabilities determined to be of "Extreme Relative Significance" in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements received a numerical value of "four."

2. Capabilities determined to be of "High Relative Significance" in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements received a numerical value of "three."

3. Capabilities determined to be of "Moderate Relative Significance" in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements received a numerical value of "two."

4. Capabilities determined to be of "Low Relative Significance" in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements received a numerical value of "one."

5. Capabilities determined to have the "Least Relative Significance" in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements received a numerical value of "zero."

The total number of responses in each "Category of Relative Significance" was multiplied by the category's value, and then added together to provide a point total for each capability. Table 7 depicts the "cumulative point value" process for criterion 1:

Table 7. Evaluation Criterion 1: "Cumulative Point Value" Process

MEU (SOC) Capability	Number of Responses in each Category of Relative Significance					Total Points
	Extreme (Value of 4)	High (Value of 3)	Mod (Value of 2)	Low (Value of 1)	Least (Value of 0)	
1. Amphibious Assault (AA)	3 (12)	0 (0)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16

Next, an apportioned scale process was used to place each capability into a "Final Categories of Relative Significance." The range between the highest and lowest total point values was calculated and divided by five to determine the point scale for each of the "Final Categories of Relative Significance" for criterion 1. The highest total point value was twenty and the lowest was eight. The following point scale was established:

1. Capabilities with a total point value between nineteen and twenty were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between sixteen and eighteen were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between thirteen and fifteen were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between ten and twelve were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between eight and ten were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance."

Table 30 in appendix E shows the cumulative point process and "Final Categories of Relative Significance" for each of the MEU (SOC) capabilities for criteria 1. Once each capability was placed into a "Final Category of Relative Significance", a subvalue for each capability was calculated by multiplying the value of the "Final Category of Relative Significance" of each capability by the value of evaluation criteria 1; which is three. Table 8 depicts the final results of the research conducted within criterion 1. These results are also included tables 36 and 37 in appendix K which is the master matrix used to calculate the model's final outcome.

Table 8. Evaluation Criterion 1: Final Results
(This criterion has a value of 3.)

Final Categories of Relative Significance	MEU(SOC) Capabilities	Point Sub-values (Equation)
Extreme Relative Significance (Value of 4)	Security Operations (SO) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	12 (4X3)
High Relative Significance (Value of 3)	Amphibious Assault (AA) Amphibious Demonstration (AD) Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) Peace Ops (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement) (PO) Reinforcement Operations (RO) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Airfield/Port Seizure (APS) Show of Force Operations (SOFO) JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	9 (3X3)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	Amphibious Raid (AR) Amphibious Withdrawal (AW) Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF) Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Mat'l (SSPM) Tactical Deception Operations (TDO) Fire Support Planning... (FSP) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG) Counterintelligence Operations (CIO)	6 (2X3)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	In –Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO) Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT) Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW) Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)	3 (1X3)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	Counter-prolif of Wpns of Mass Destruction (CPWMD) Sniping Operations (SNO)	0 (0X3)

Criterion 2: The Marine Corps Identifies the MEU (SOC) Capability as Needed to Meet Theater CINC's Operational Requirements

Evaluation criterion 2 was selected as a MEU (SOC) evaluation criterion by the subject matter experts during the initial thesis survey as second in importance only to criterion 1. During the personal interviews, the survey respondents said the Service Chief's mission to train, man, and equip their service to provide the Theater CINCs with relevant and capable forces placed the burden upon the Service Chief to determine the capabilities his service's units should posses. Since my model had been developed upon the concept of evaluating the MEU (SOC) capabilities relative to each other, I initially envisioned conducting my research within this criterion in such a manned that would result in a prioritization, or categorization, of the MEU (SOC) capabilities similar to the other four evaluation criteria. In this vein, I delivered a questionnaire to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, on 14 January 1998, when he was visiting Fort Leavenworth, Ka., requesting that he place each of the MEU (SOC) capabilities into categories of significance relative to each other. General Krulak responded with a personal letter in which he elected not to complete the questionnaire, but rather he provided meaningful insight and personal feelings about the overall usefulness of today's MEU (SOC) program.[6]

The current MCO pertaining to the MEU (SOC) program, as well as previous orders pertaining to the program, makes no judgement pertaining to the relative value of MEU (SOC) capabilities. Additionally, discussion with senior Marine officials who have participated in previous MEU (SOC) standardization and review conferences reveal the

opinion of the members of these conferences is there is no discrimination between the MEU (SOC) capabilities.

Taking these factors into consideration, I have concluded the U.S. Marine Corps considers all of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities to be of equal relative significance in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements; none are either more or less than the others. As a result, all twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities are placed in the final category of "Moderate Relative Significance" for this evaluation criterion. When applied to the analysis model, the weighting of the capabilities within this criterion will not serve as a discriminator, but will provide a useful datum when comparing the results of all evaluation criteria to each other.

Table 9 depicts the final results of the research conducted within criterion 2. These results are also in tables 36 and 37 in appendix K.

Table 9. Evaluation Criterion 2: Final Results
(This criterion has a value of 2.)

Final Categories of Relative Significance	MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Point Subvalues (Equation)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	All 29 MEU (SOC) Capabilities	4 (2X2)

Criterion 3: The Capability is Unique to the MEU (SOC).

The intent of this evaluation criterion is to measure the relative validity of each MEU (SOC) capability based upon how many other U.S. military units can provide the Theater CINCs with the same capability. The process reveals: the more unique the

capability, or the less redundant, the more valid it is. Consequently, capabilities with greater redundancy are less valid.

Initial attempts to determine the capabilities of other military units by reviewing their applicable service publications proved futile. The publications reviewed were either ambiguous or contained classified information which could not be used within the constraints of this study. Once again I took advantage of the diverse and experienced officer population aboard Fort Leavenworth, Ka., by identifying SMEs who had previous experience in units from other U.S. military branches that directly support the Theater CINCs. I conducted personal interviews with twelve officers from the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines to discuss the capabilities of their various units, and left each with the questionnaire found in appendix F. All twelve of the SMEs I interviewed returned the questionnaire for a return rate of one hundred percent.

Unlike questionnaires previously distributed, this questionnaire was not intended to serve as an opinion survey asking the respondent for his subjective input. Rather, the purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain objective input; a tally of units with capabilities similar to the MEU (SOC). The respondent was asked to review the definition of each MEU (SOC) capability as set forth in appendix A, and indicate if the unit from which he had subject matter experience was tasked and trained to conduct that capability. The respondent was also asked to comment if there were certain conditions, limitations, or deviations from the definition of the MEU (SOC) capabilities that were necessary for execution so that I could gauge the true similarities between the unit for which he spoke and the MEU (SOC). Whenever possible, I interviewed multiple officers with experience in the similar units to cross-reference their input.

I first interviewed SMEs from the following U.S. Army units: four with experience in special forces units,[7-10] two with experience in ranger units,[11-12] one with airborne unit experience.[13] Although not interviewed, a SME with air assault unit experience responded to the questionnaire.[14] Next I interviewed a U.S. Navy SME with experience in conventional navy units[15], and one with experience in naval special warfare units.[16] I interviewed a U. S. Air Force SME with experience in special tactics units.[17] I then interviewed a Marine with experience in SOCOM's SMU.[18] Finally, I used my own personal experience to evaluate the capabilities of Marine ACF. A complete respondent profile is found in table 31in Appendix G, which indicates the considerable experience of these SMEs.

Although the questionnaires provided objective input, the task remained to conduct a comparative analysis of each MEU (SOC) capability to determine its relative uniqueness. This step required qualitative judgement in determining the actual extent of similarities that existed between the MEU (SOC) and units with similar capabilities when those other units could only partially conduct the capability, or they required certain conditions necessary for execution. The measure of other units ability to conduct each capability was based on its ability to conduct the capability per the definition of the MEU (SOC) capability. A value weighting system was utilized, whereby the units that could conduct the capability in the same fashion as the MEU (SOC) received full value, and units that could partially conduct the capability, or required certain conditions for execution, received partial value. Once these initial values were made, the total values for each capability were added together to derive a total point value. Table 10 depicts this process:

Table 10. Evaluation Criterion 3: Determining Point Values

29 MEU (SOC) Capabilities	SF	RANGR	ABN	AASLT	USN	SEALs	ST	SMU	ACF	TOTAL
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	1	1	1	1	0	½	0	1	0	5 ½

Table 32 in appendix G shows all calculations for criterion 3.

The next step was to place each of the MEU (SOC) capabilities into " Final Categories of Relative Significance" for this criterion. This was accomplished based upon the final point values for each capability and the following scale:

1. Capabilities with a total point value between zero and one were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between two and three were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between four and five were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between six and seven were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between eight and nine were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance."

Once each capability was placed into a "Final Category of Relative Significance," a subvalue for each capability was calculated by multiplying the value of the "Final Category of Relative Significance" of each capability by the value of evaluation criteria

3; which is two. Table 11 depicts the final results of the research conducted within criterion 3. These results are also included tables 36 and 37 in appendix K.

Table 11. Evaluation Criterion 3: Final Results
(This criterion has a value of 2.)

Final Categories of Relative Significance	MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Point Sub-values (Equation)
Extreme Relative Significance (Value of 4)	Amphibious Assault (AA) Amphibious Demonstration (AD) Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	8 (4X2)
High Relative Significance (Value of 3)	In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF) Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) Counter-prolif of Wpns of Mass Destruction (CPWMD) Counterintelligence Operations (CIO) Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	6 (3X2)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	Amphibious Raid (AR) Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO) Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Mat'l (SSPM) Peace Ops (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement) (PO) Security Operations (SO) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Reinforcement Operations (RO) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW) Show of Force Operations (SOFO) JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	4 (2X2)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT) Tactical Deception Operations (TDO) Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG) Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO) Sniping Operations (SNO)	2 (1X2)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	Fire Support Planning... (FSP) Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)	0 (0X2)

Criterion 4: The Capability Requires Training Time Commensurate With Other MEU (SOC) Capabilities

The intent of this evaluation criterion is to discriminate between the capabilities which required the most training and those that required the least, in such a way that those capabilities which required the least training would be considered more favorable, and therefore placed in the highest "Final Category of Relative Significance." Consequently, those capabilities that required the most training would be least favorable and placed in the lowest "Final Category of Relative Significance." Training time, when viewed in isolation, is a difficult criterion on which to judge the relative validity of the MEU (SOC) capabilities. In this context, training time is viewed as an expense, and therefore the more time required to train for a given capability, the greater the expense. While simply training more for a MEU (SOC) capability does not render that capability less valid in itself, this study seeks to determine how the criterion of training time effects the relative validity of each MEU (SOC) capability when combined with the other four evaluation criteria. A MEU (SOC) capability determined to be of low relative significance in the other evaluation criterion, and also requires more training time than other MEU (SOC) capabilities, will be further be determined to be of overall low relative validity.

As previously noted, research within this criterion began with identifying SMEs in the area of MEU (SOC) pre-deployment training requirements, conducting telephonic interviews, and following up the interviews with questionnaires. I elected to solicit input from two levels of oversight within the MEU (SOC) program: the Marine Forces (component) level, and the MEF/SOTG level. At the Marine Forces level I conducted

telephonic interviews with the MEU (SOC) action officers at Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic[19] and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific.[20] At the MEF/SOTG level I interviewed officers from either the G-3 or the G-7, depending on which staff section exercised cognizance over the MEU (SOC) program. Within I MEF, I interviewed the MEF G-7,[21] and the Operations Officer of 1st SOTG.[22] Within II MEF I interviewed the MEU Action Officer in the G-3,[23] and the 2d SOTG Operations Officer.[24] Within III MEF I interviewed the Deputy Director of 3d SOTG.[26] Of the eight questionnaires sent, a total of ten were returned, as several of the respondents included additional questionnaires completed by other SMEs within their units. In two cases, follow-up telephonic interviews were required to clarify the respondent's remarks on their questionnaire. Table 33 in appendix I provides a complete respondent profile.

The results of the questionnaires were tabulated and a "cumulative point value" process similar to criterion 1 was used to obtain a point value for each of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities. However, an inverse weighting system was utilized for this criterion in order to place the greatest value on those capabilities that required the least training. The respondents placed each MEU (SOC) capability into one of five "Categories of Training Time" which were weighted as follows:

1. Capabilities that required most of the training time, or more than fifteen percent of overall training time, were placed in the "Extreme" category of training time and received a value of "zero."

2. Capabilities that required more training time than average, or between ten and fifteen percent of overall training time, were placed in the "High" category of training time and received a value of "one."

3. Capabilities that required the average amount of training time, or between five and ten percent of overall training time, were placed in the "Moderate" category of training time and received a value of "two."

4. Capabilities that required less training time than average, or between zero and five percent of overall training time, were placed in the "Low" category of training time and received a value of "three."

5. Capabilities that required no training time, or were generalized from training for one of the other capabilities, were placed in the "None" category of training time and received a value of "four."

The total number of responses in each "Category of Training Time" were multiplied by the category's value, and then added together to provide a point total for each capability. Table 12 depicts the "cumulative point value" process for criterion 4:

Table 12. Evaluation Criterion 4: "Cumulative Point Value" Process

MEU(SOC) Capability	Number of Responses in each "Category of Training Time"					Total Points
	NONE (Value of 4)	LOW (Value of 3)	MOD (Value of 2)	HIGH (Value of 1)	EXTR (Value of 0)	
24. Counter-intel Ops (CIO)	1 (4)	2 (6)	6 (12)	1 (1)	0 (0)	23

Next, an apportioned scale process was used to place each capability into a "Final Categories of Relative Significance." The range between the highest and lowest total point values was calculated and divided by five to determine the point scale for each of the "Final Categories of Relative Significance" for criterion 4. The highest total point

value was thirty-three, and the lowest was four. Therefore, the following point scale was established:

1. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-eight and thirty-three were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-two and twenty-seven were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between sixteen and twenty-one were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between ten and fifteen were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between four and nine were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance."

Table 34 in appendix I shows the cumulative point value process and "Final Categories of Relative Significance" for each of the MEU (SOC) capabilities for criteria 4.

Once each capability was placed into a "Final Category of Relative Significance," a subvalue for each capability was calculated by multiplying the value of the "Final Category of Relative Significance" of each capability by the value of evaluation criteria 4; which is two. Table 13 depicts the final results of the research conducted within criterion 4. These results are also included tables 36 and 37 in appendix K.

Table 13. Evaluation Criterion 4: Final Results
(This criterion has a value of 2.)

Final Categories of Relative Significance	MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Point Sub-values (Equation)
Extreme Relative Significance (Value of 4)	Amphibious Demonstration (AD) Counter-prolif of Wpns of Mass Destruction (CPWMD) Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT) Show of Force Operations (SOFO)	8 (4X2)
High Relative Significance (Value of 3)	Amphibious Withdrawal (AW) Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF) Reinforcement Operations (RO) Tactical Deception Operations (TDO) Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW) Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG) Counterintelligence Operations (CIO) Airfield/Port Seizure (APS) Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO) JTF Enabling Operations (JEO) Sniping Operations (SNO)	6 (3X2)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	Amphibious Assault (AA) Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO) Peace Ops (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement) (PO) Security Operations (SO) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Fire Support Planning... (FSP) Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)	4 (2X2)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Mat'l (SSPM) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	2 (1X2)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	Amphibious Raid (AR) In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	0 (0X2)

Criterion 5: The Capability Has Been Executed By a MEU (SOC) During an Operation in the Past Eight Years

The concept of this evaluation criterion is to measure the relative validity of each MEU (SOC) capability based upon how many times it has been executed in a named operation in the past. The theory is the more times a capability has been executed in the past, the higher the likelihood for its use in the future, and therefore, the more valid it is.

Table 14 lists the named operations that involved a MEU (SOC) during the past eight years from January 1990 to December 1997.[27]

Table 14. Criterion #5: MEU (SOC) Involvement in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Ref #	Operation Name	Year Started	Location	MEUs Involved
1	SHARP EDGE[27-36]	1990	Liberia	22d , 26th
2	DESERT SHIELD/STORM[37-40]	1990	SWA	11th, 13th
3	PROVIDE COMFORT[41-51]	1991	Turkey/N. Iraq	24th
4	FIERY VIGIL[52-54]	1991	Philippines	15th
5	HOT ROCK[55]	1992	Italy	24th
6	SHARP GUARD, PROVIDE PROMISE, DENY FLIGHT, JOINT ENDEAVOR[56-60]	1992	Adriatic sea	22d, 24th, 26th
7	IMPRESSIVE LIFT[61]	1992	Somalia	11th
8	RESTORE/ CONTINUED HOPE[62-71]	1992	Somalia	11th,13th,15th, 22d,24th,26th
9	SUPPORT DEMOCRACY[72-73]	1994	Haiti	24th
10	DISTANT RUNNER[74-76]	1994	Rwanda	11th
11	SUPPORT HOPE[77]	1994	Rwanda/Uganda	15th
12	UNITED SHIELD[78-83]	1995	Somalia	13th
13	VIGILANT WARRIOR[84]	1995	Southwest Asia	11th
14	ASSURED RESPONSE[85-91]	1996	Liberia	22d
15	QUICK RESPONSE[92-95]	1996	Central Africa	22d
16	SILVER WAKE[96-99]	1997	Albania	22d, 26th
17	GUARDIAN RETR'VAL[100-103]	1997	Zaire	22d, 26th
18	NOBLE OBELISK[104-108]	1997	Sierra Leone	22d
19	SILENT ASSURANCE	1997	Qatar	13th

Each operation was studied in detail to determine which MEU (SOC) capabilities were executed. I did not include in my final tally those capabilities that had been planned for, only those actually executed. I included only those capabilities executed by a MEU (SOC), and not by any other type of MAGTF. Additionally, I did not include capabilities that were executed by a MEU (SOC) outside of a named operation.

After studying each operation, I added up the total number of times each capability had been executed during the past eight years. Several inherent difficulties were discovered in applying this type of approach to capturing MEU (SOC) capability usage. First, there was no discrimination or weighting between different types or magnitudes of the named operations studied. As a result, simple operations that included only a small portion of the MEU (SOC) such as Operation HOT ROCK in Italy in 1992 carried as much weight as more complex operations involving the entire MEU (SOC) such as Operation PROVIDE PROMISE in Northern Iraq in 1991. Second, even though a MEU (SOC) capability may have been executed more than once in any given operation, no additional credit was given. The results were recorded in a simple "yes" or "no" manner for each operation, as seen in appendix J, and the number of "yes" responses were totaled to provide a point value for each capability. Finally, a similar method of analysis had not previously been conducted, and available sources of information did not address the execution of each MEU (SOC) capability in each operation. As such, in several instances there were gaps of information in which I made assumptions about the execution of MEU (SOC) capabilities based upon the supporting evidence and my own

personal experience as a BLT Operations Officer with the 24th MEU (SOC) in 1996. The results of this research are found in Table 35 in appendix J.

Next, an apportioned scale process was used to place each capability into a "Final Categories of Relative Significance." The range between the highest and lowest total point values was calculated and divided by five to determine the point scale for each of the "Final Categories of Relative Significance" for criterion 5. The highest total point value was twelve, and the lowest was zero. Therefore, the following point scale was established:

1. MEU (SOC) capabilities executed more than eight times were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance," and received a value of "four."

2. MEU (SOC) capabilities executed between six and seven times were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance," and received a value of "three."

3. MEU (SOC) capabilities executed between four and five were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance," and received a value of "two."

4. MEU (SOC) capabilities executed between two and three times were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance," and received a value of "one."

5. MEU (SOC) capabilities executed between zero and one times were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance," and received a value of "zero."

Once each capability was placed into a "Final Category of Relative Significance," a subvalue for each capability was calculated by multiplying the value of the "Final Category of Relative Significance" of each capability by the value of evaluation criteria 5; which is one. Table 15 below depicts the final results of the research conducted within criterion 5. These results are also included in Tables 36 and 37 in appendix K.

Table 15. Evaluation Criterion 5: Final Results
(This criterion has a value of 1.)

Final Categories of Relative Significance	MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Point Sub-values (Equation)
Extreme Relative Significance (Value of 4)	Security Operations (SO) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Reinforcement Operations (RO) Fire Support Planning... (FSP) Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW) Counterintelligence Operations (CIO) Show of Force Operations (SOFO)	4 (4X1)
High Relative Significance (Value of 3)	Peace Ops (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement) (PO) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)	3 (3X1)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG) Airfield/Port Seizure (APS) Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)	2 (2X1)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	Amphibious Assault (AA) Amphibious Raid (AR) Amphibious Demonstration (AD) Amphibious Withdrawal (AW) Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) JTF Enabling Operations (JEO) Sniping Operations (SNO)	1 (1X1)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF) Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO) Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Mat'l (SSPM) Counter-prolif of Wpns of Mass Destruction (CPWMD) Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT) Tactical Deception Operations (TDO)	0 (0X1)

Final Model Computations

Tables 36 and 37 in appendix K show the computations of the multiple criteria decision-making model. A total point value was calculated for each MEU (SOC) capability by adding the point subvalues of each of the five evaluation criteria. The MEU (SOC) capabilities were then ranked in descending order based upon their final point value.

Next, an apportioned scale process was used to place each capability into a "Final Categories of Relative Validity." The range between the highest and lowest total point values was calculated and divided by five to determine the point scale for each of the "Final Categories of Relative Validity." The highest total point value was thirty, and the lowest was thirteen. Therefore, the following point scale was established:

1. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-eight and thirty were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Validity."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-four and twenty-seven were placed in a final category of "High Relative Validity."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty and twenty-three were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Validity."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between sixteen and nineteen were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Validity."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between thirteen and fifteen were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Validity."

Table 16 depicts the final outcome of the multiple criteria decision-making model for evaluation of MEU (SOC) capabilities:

Table 16. Final Results of Multiple Criteria Decision-Making Model

Final Category of Relative Validity	Rank	Final Total Value	MEU (SOC) Capability
Extreme Relative Validity	1	30	Amphibious Demonstration (AD)
	2	28	Security Operations (SO)
High Relative Validity	3	27	Reinforcement Operations (RO)
	4	27	Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)
	5	26	Amphibious Assault (AA)
	6	26	Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
	7	26	Counterintelligence Operations (CIO)
	8	26	Show of Force Operations (SOFO)
	9	25	Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)
	10	24	Peace Operations (PO)
	11	24	Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
	12	24	JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)
Moderate Relative Validity	13	22	Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)
	14	22	Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)
	15	22	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
	16	22	Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
	17	21	Signal Intelligence / Electronic Warfare (SI/EW)
	18	20	Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)
Low Relative Validity	19	18	Counter-prolif of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD)
	20	18	Tactical Deception Operations (TDO)
	21	18	Fire Support Planning, Coordination..(FSP)
	22	17	Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT)
	23	17	Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)
	24	16	Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)
	25	16	Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
Least Relative Validity	26	15	Amphibious Raid (AR)
	27	15	Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO)
	28	13	In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)
	29	13	Sniping Operations (SNO)

Analysis of MEU (SOC) Capabilities Determined to be of "Least Relative Validity"

Table 38 in appendix L provides a comparison of the "Final Categories of Significance" of each of the five evaluation criteria for each MEU (SOC) capability. This table will be the basis for my further analysis.

I intend to analyze designated capabilities which were places in the final category of "Least Relative Validity" to determine if there are other factors which might justify a higher overall relative validity. My analysis will begin with the MEU (SOC) capability that received the lowest total point value.

MEU (SOC) capabilities within three of the four broad categories of Amphibious Operations, Direct Action Operations, and Supporting Operations were included in the final category of "Least Relative Validity." However, I will not examine the capabilities in the category of Supporting Operations. These capabilities, by definition, support the full spectrum of MEU (SOC) operations and will not be evaluated on a stand-alone basis. The following capabilities will be further analyzed:

1. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR). (Direct Action Operations)
2. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO). (Direct Action Operations)
3. Amphibious Raid (AR). (Amphibious Operations)

At this point I will depart from the statistical analysis of this study and analyze the results of the research in a more practical manner. Rather than focusing on point values and "Categories of Relative Significance," I will conduct a cross-walk between results of each evaluation criteria for a specific MEU (SOC) capability to determine if, collectively, the final results are truly indicative of the overall "Relative Validity" of the capability.

In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)

Table 17 depicts the results of the study with reference to the IHR capability.

Table 17. Capability #5: In-Extremis Hostage Recovery

Evaluation Criteria	Final Categories of Relative Significance				
	Extreme	High	Mod	Low	Least
1: CINC's requirements				X	
2: USMC requirements			X		
3: Uniqueness		X			
4: Training requirements					X
5: Historically proven					X
Final Category of Relative Validity					**X**

Although categorized as "Low" in criterion 1, the IHR capability was placed in the "Extreme" category by two of the five respondents, indicating a geographic-based requirement for the capability. These responses are indicative of all twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities, and illustrate the challenge of the MEU (SOC) program to provide a "general purpose" force capable of responding to the needs of the Theater CINCs of several unified commands in which a MEU (SOC) may be deployed.

The strong suit of the IHR is its relative uniqueness. Although there are at least three other types of U.S. military special operations forces units that are capable of executing an IHR, the capability of a forward deployed MEU (SOC) to conduct an IHR offers the Theater CINC a form of insurance when the situation is time critical. National-level IHR assets, such as USSOCOM's SMU, may not be able to close within the target area in sufficient time to execute a time-sensitive mission.

However, as criterion 5 points out, in the past eight years, and in fact since the inception of the MEU (SOC) program, no situation has called for the execution of an IHR. The closest a MEU (SOC) has actually come to executing an IHR was the Maritime Special Purpose Force launched during Operation RESTORE HOPE more accurately categorized as a Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel/Material (SSPM) mission.[111]

The major drawback of the IHR is the requirement for training resources. Respondents placed the IHR in the highest "Category of Training Time", which translated to the "Least Relative Significance" in terms of training expense. A strong argument can be made that training for the IHR is transferable to the other capabilities within Direct Action Operations such as SDO, SSPM, and VBSS, and that these skills transfer from one capability to the next. Although it is difficult to establish clean demarcations in terms of training to meet specialized skill requirements, consider that none of the capabilities within the category of Direct Action Operations were determined to be of "Extreme" or "High Relative Validity" in the final outcome of the model. The relevant issue in the discussion of the IHR capability is the comparison of investment requirements for the IHR versus the actual requirement, or likelihood, of executing an IHR mission.

The IHR capability is the most controversial of all MEU (SOC) capabilities, and has been the subject of heated debate during the past 10 years.[109-110] The discussion of the IHR capability evoked an emotional response from most of the U.S. Marines interviewed or who returned questionnaires.

Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO)

Table 18 depicts the results of the study with reference to the SDO capability.

Table 18. Capability 8: Specialized Demolitions Operations

Evaluation Criteria	Final Categories of Relative Significance				
	Extreme	High	Mod	Low	Least
1: CINC's requirements				X	
2: USMC requirements			X		
3: Uniqueness			X		
4: Training requirements			X		
5: Historically proven					X
Final Category of Relative Validity					**X**

SDO is one of the eight capabilities that was added to the list of MEU (SOC) capabilities in the most recent MEU (SOC) order signed in 1997. SDO, by definition, is conducted in support of other special operations, and therefore should be considered in the same manner as are the twelve capabilities of the Supporting Operations category: not as a stand-alone capability. While researching within this capability it became evident the majority of the respondents did not understand the definition of SDO or its applicability to the other Direct Action capabilities. SDO is the highly specialized demolitions capability that pertains primarily to the demolition requirements to conduct forced entry operations during IHR and SSPM missions, and should not be confused with other general demolitions capabilities resident within the MEU (SOC).

Two of the five Unified Command Deputy J-3s considered the SDO to be of "High Relative Significance", once again demonstrating a possible geographic-based requirement. Coincidentally, these were the same Deputy J-3s that considered the IHR

capability to be of "Extreme Relative Significance," indicating these respondents understand the relationship between the two capabilities. Based on its close association with the other Direct Action capabilities, specifically the IHR, the historical usage of SDO was limited to the usage of the other Direct Action capabilities; relatively non-existent. As such, SDO becomes inextricably linked to the IHR and an analysis of one must include an analysis of the other.

Amphibious Raid (AR)

The AR provides the operational focus for the entire MEU (SOC) program.[112] Due to its forward deployed naval character, the MEU (SOC) assumes a natural raid mentality in that it performs nearly all of its missions from naval ships into the objective area, followed by a planned withdrawal. The AR, more than any other capability, has a generalized effect on all other capabilities, and therefore should be considered as a facilitator, or enabler, of other MEU (SOC) capabilities as well as an individual capability in itself.

During the MEU (SOC) predeployment training program, most missions are planned to be executed in a typical five-phase AR sequence. Phase one is the insertion or movement by surface of heliborne methods from the ship to the point of insertion. Phase two is the movement from the point of insertion to the objective area. Phase three includes actions within the objective area. Phase four is the movement from the objective area to the point of extraction, and phase five is the extraction of forces back to the ships. This five-phase training approach standardizes tactics, techniques, and procedures used by MEU (SOC) units during phases one, two, four, and five of all executable missions,

not just the AR. Once units have mastered these four phases, they can focus on training to execute a number of other MEU (SOC) capabilities within phase three, actions in the objective area. Therefore, when units train to execute capabilities other than the AR, they usually only focus on training to complete actions in the objective area.

Although the AR has extraordinary value to the MEU (SOC) program as stated above, the peculiarities of the methodology of this study analyze the AR primarily on a stand-alone basis. Table 19 depicts the results of the study for the AR capability. From this study it can be seen that the high level of training required for proficiency resulted in the AR's unfavorable relative significance, an anomaly which has already been explained. Furthermore, the historical examples of AR execution accounted only for the instances where the AR was executed as a stand alone capability, and did not account for the fact that nearly every capability ever executed by a MEU (SOC) was conducted in some semblance of an AR.

Table 19. Capability 2: Amphibious Raid

Evaluation Criteria	Final Categories of Relative Significance				
	Extreme	High	Mod	Low	Least
1: CINC's requirements			X		
2: USMC requirements			X		
3: Uniqueness			X		
4: Training requirements					X
5: Historically proven				X	
Final Category of Relative Validity					**X**

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The multiple criteria decision-making model has proved useful in analyzing the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities in light of multiple, conflicting evaluation criteria. The data gathered during this study strongly supports the final results of the model. As stated in chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to provide an alternative form of analysis to augment the traditional subjective process of MEU (SOC) capability evaluation. Given the current trend within the Department of Defense to downsize the armed forces, the Marine Corps could find itself in a more resource-constrained environment in the near future, and forced to make difficult decisions regarding the reduction of capabilities of the forward-deployed MEU (SOC). In this situation, an alternative form of analysis is beneficial in determining which capabilities might be deleted from the MEU (SOC) repertoire. It is within the frame of possible MEU (SOC) capability reduction that I will answer the thesis questions.

Having completed the analysis of all twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities, it is evident that all capabilities should not be compared against all others to determine the relative validity of each. Therefore, I will place each MEU (SOC) capability into one of the following four classifications for purposes of identifying those MEU (SOC) capabilities that should be analyzed for final relative validity: Enabling Capabilities, Complimentary Capabilities, Value-added Capabilities, and Core Capabilities. Only those capabilities placed in the Core Capabilities classification will be analyzed for final relative validity.

The first classification, Enabling Capabilities, actually includes only one MEU (SOC) capability: the Amphibious Raid (AR). As explained in chapter 4, the AR provides the operational focus for the entire MEU (SOC) program. The enabling characteristic of the AR offers more value to the MEU (SOC) program in terms of operational focus than the value of the AR when viewed as an isolated capability. Viewed as the enabler for all MEU (SOC) capabilities, the AR will not be compared against other MEU (SOC) capabilities in terms of relative validity.

The second classification, Complimentary Capabilities, includes those MEU (SOC) capabilities which support the execution of other MEU (SOC) capabilities, and when deleted have secondary effects on the entire MEU (SOC) program. This classification, although similar, is not the same as the Supporting Operations category of MEU (SOC) capabilities. While most of the capabilities within the Supporting Operations category are included in the classification of Complimentary Capabilities, I also include capabilities from other categories that fit the definition of "supporting other MEU (SOC) capabilities." Likewise, capabilities in the Supporting Operations category that could possibly be executed on a stand-alone basis are not included in this classification. The following MEU (SOC) capabilities are placed in the Complimentary Capabilities classification and are not evaluated for final relative validity:

1. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO). This capability supports all other direct action and special operations.

2. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD). By definition, the ability to conduct this capability is limited to the application of the other 28 MEU (SOC) capabilities.

3. The following MEU (SOC) capabilities within the Supporting Operations category are included in the Complimentary Capabilities classification since they support the full spectrum of MEU (SOC) operations:

a. Tactical Deception Operations (TDO).

b. Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment (FSP).

c. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW).

d. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).

e. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S).

f. Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG).

g. Counterintelligence Operations (CIO).

h. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO).

i. Show of Force Operations (SOFO).

j. Sniping Operations (SNO).

Two capabilities in the Supporting Operations category, Airfield/Port Seizure (APS) and JTF Enabling Operations (JEO), are not included in the Complimentary Capabilities classification. These capabilities can be executed on a stand-alone basis and are included in the fourth classification.

The third classification, Value-added Capabilities, includes MEU (SOC) capabilities that are generalized from the training for other MEU (SOC) capabilities and therefore require insignificant resources. When considering possible MEU (SOC) capability reductions, it makes no sense to consider deleting Value-added Capabilities as these capabilities are realized without relative costs. Capabilities placed in the category

of "Least Relative Training Time" by the respondents of the questionnaire in appendix H, which translated into capabilities placed in the "Final Category of Extreme Significance" in table 13, were placed in the classification of Value-added Capabilities. These capabilities include:

1. Amphibious Demonstration (AD).

2. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD). (This capability is also a Complimentary Capability.)

3. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT).

4. Show of Force Operations (SOFO). (This capability is also a Complimentary Capability.)

The remaining fourteen MEU (SOC) capabilities were placed in the fourth classification: Core Capabilities. These capabilities were identified as capabilities that can be conducted on a stand-alone basis, and when considered individually in terms of their overall relative validity, could possible be considered for deletion from the MEU (SOC) program without adversely effecting the entire program.

Table 20 depicts the distribution of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities within the four classifications outlined above. Only those capabilities in the Core Capabilities classification will be considered when answering the thesis questions.

Table 20. Classifications of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	MEU (SOC) Classification
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS	
1. Amphibious Assault (AA)	Core Capabilities
2. Amphibious Raid (AR)	Enabling Capabilities
3. Amphibious Demonstration (AD)	Value-added Capabilities
4. Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Core Capabilities
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS	
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Core Capabilities
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Fac. (SOEF)	Core Capabilities
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (VBSS)	Core Capabilities
8. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO)	Complementary Capabilities
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Core Capabilities
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Pers/Material (SSPM)	Core Capabilities
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD)	Complementary/Value-added Capabilities
MOOTW	
12. Peace Operations (PO)	Core Capabilities
13. Security Operations (SO)	Core Capabilities
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	Core Capabilities
15. Reinforcement Operations (RO)	Core Capabilities
16. Joint/Combined Training / Instruction Team (JTT)	Value-added Capabilities
17. Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	Core Capabilities
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS	
18. Tactical Deception Operations (TDO)	Complementary Capabilities
19. Fire Support Planning, Coordination...(FSP)	Complementary Capabilities
20. Signal Intelligence / Electronic Warfare (SI/EW)	Complementary Capabilities
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)	Complementary Capabilities
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)	Complementary Capabilities
23. Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)	Complementary Capabilities
24. Counterintelligence Operations (CIO)	Complementary Capabilities
25. Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Core Capabilities
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)	Complementary Capabilities
27. Show of Force Operations (SOFO)	Complementary/Value-added Capabilities
28. JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Core Capabilities
29. Sniping Operations (SNO)	Complementary Capabilities

Answer to the Primary Thesis Question

"Which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the highest relative validity?" Table 21 depicts the final overall relative validity of the fourteen MEU (SOC) capabilities in the Core Capabilities classification from highest to lowest relative validity:

Table 21. Final Overall Relative Validity

MEU (SOC) Capability	General Capability Category
HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY	
Security Operations (SO)	MOOTW
Reinforcement Operations (RO)	MOOTW
Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Supporting Ops
Amphibious Assault (AA)	Amphibious Ops
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	MOOTW
Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Amphibious Ops
Peace Operations (PO)	MOOTW
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	MOOTW
JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Supporting Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	Direct Action Ops
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)	Direct Action Ops
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Direct Action Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	Direct Action Ops
In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Direct Action Ops
LEAST RELATIVE VALIDITY	

Answer to the Secondary Questions

Table 21 also answers secondary question 1, "Which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the least relative validity?"

Secondary question 2, "What evaluation criteria should be used to analyze the Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities to determine their relative validity?" was answered in chapter 3 of this thesis. In addition to the five criteria selected, I offer a sixth: "Total

train and equip for the MEU (SOC) capability is commensurate with other capabilities." This study selected training time alone as a measure of expenses associated with each MEU (SOC) capability, when in reality there are many more expenses.

For secondary questions 3 and 4, "From the perspective of each separate evaluation criteria, which of the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities have the highest and the least relative validity?," I once again considered only those fourteen MEU (SOC) capabilities placed in the Core Capabilities classification and prioritized in Table 21. Tables 22 through 25 depict the final relative validity of those capabilities within four of the five evaluation criteria. Within evaluation criterion 2 all twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities were determined to have the same relative validity.

Table 22. Final Relative Validity for Criterion 1 (CINC Requirements)

MEU (SOC) Capability	Capability Category
HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY	
Security Operations (SO)	MOOTW
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	MOOTW
Amphibious Assault (AA)	Amphibious Ops
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)	Direct Action Ops
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Direct Action Ops
Peace Operations (PO)	MOOTW
Reinforcement Operations (RO)	MOOTW
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	MOOTW
Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Supporting Ops
JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Supporting Ops
Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Amphibious Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	Direct Action Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	Direct Action Ops
In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Direct Action Ops
LEAST RELATIVE VALIDITY	

Table 23. Final Relative Validity for Criterion 3 (Uniqueness)

MEU (SOC) Capability	Capability Category
HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY	
Amphibious Assault (AA)	Amphibious Ops
Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Amphibious Ops
In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Direct Action Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	Direct Action Ops
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)	Direct Action Ops
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Direct Action Ops
Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Supporting Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	Direct Action Ops
Peace Operations (PO)	MOOTW
Security Operations (SO)	MOOTW
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	MOOTW
Reinforcement Operations (RO)	MOOTW
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	MOOTW
JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Supporting Ops
LEAST RELATIVE VALIDITY	

Table 24. Final relative Validity for Criterion 4 (Training)

MEU (SOC) Capability	Capability Category
HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY	
Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Amphibious Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	Direct Action Ops
Reinforcement Operations (RO)	MOOTW
Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Supporting Ops
JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Supporting Ops
Amphibious Assault (AA)	Amphibious Ops
Peace Operations (PO)	MOOTW
Security Operations (SO)	MOOTW
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	MOOTW
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)	Direct Action Ops
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Direct Action Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	Direct Action Ops
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	MOOTW
In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Direct Action Ops
LEAST RELATIVE VALIDITY	

Table 25. Final Relative Validity for Criterion 5 (History)

MEU (SOC) Capability	Capability Category
HIGHEST RELATIVE VALIDITY	
Security Operations (SO)	MOOTW
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	MOOTW
Reinforcement Operations (RO)	MOOTW
Peace Operations (PO)	MOOTW
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	MOOTW
Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	Supporting Ops
Amphibious Assault (AA)	Amphibious Ops
Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	Amphibious Ops
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (Maritime) (VBSS)	Direct Action Ops
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	Direct Action Ops
JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	Supporting Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	Direct Action Ops
Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	Direct Action Ops
In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	Direct Action Ops
LEAST RELATIVE VALIDITY	

Finally, in answering secondary question 5, "Should the Marine Corps add or delete from the twenty-nine MEU (SOC) capabilities?" at this time the answer is no. Given the current circumstances with regards to available resources, the MEU (SOC) program seems to have struck the proper balance of capabilities. However, should circumstances change and the Marine Corps determine the need to reduce MEU (SOC) capabilities in the future, I would recommend deleting the following capabilities:

1. In-extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR).
2. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM).

Unexpected Findings

There were three unexpected findings resulting from this study. First, was the overall low relative validity of all of the capabilities in the Direct Action category. The Direct Action capabilities evoke an emotional response within the Marine Corps, especially the In-extremis Hostage Recovery capability, as discussed in chapter 4. The Direct Action capabilities are those capabilities of the MEU (SOC) that closely parallel some of the sensitive capabilities of USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces (SOF), and therefore generate debate about redundancy of capabilities and appropriateness of non-SOF forces to conduct such missions. The Direct Action capabilities generate much of the "special operations" aura inherent in the MEU (SOC) program, and are generally believed to be extremely important by most Marines involved in the program due to the amount of time training for these capabilities. However, all of the Direct Action capabilities within the Core Capabilities classification were determined less valid than the MOOTW and Amphibious Operations capabilities in the final comparison.

The second unexpected finding was the correlation between the final overall relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities depicted in table 21 and the final relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities within each of the four evaluation criterion as depicted in tables 22 through 25. The closest correlation can be seen between the final overall relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities in table 21 and the final relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities for evaluation criterion 5 in table 25. This strong relationship was unexpected because evaluation criterion 5, "The capability has been executed by a MEU (SOC) during an operation in the past eight years," was weighted the least of all five evaluation criteria and had less impact on the multiple criteria decision-

making model in terms of point values. However, the close correlation indicates that evaluation criterion 5 is probably more important in determining overall validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities than expressed in the model.

A comparison between the final overall relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities in table 21 and the final relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities for evaluation criterion 3 in table 23 reveal the two are inversely related. The final relative validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities for evaluation criteria 3, "The capability is unique to the MEU (SOC)," indicates capabilities in the MOOTW category are generally less relative than capabilities in the Amphibious Operations and Direct Action categories; the exact opposite of the final overall relative validity. Although evaluation criterion 3 was moderately weighted in the model, this finding suggests that evaluation criterion 3 is probably less important in determining overall validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities than expressed in the model.

The third unexpected finding was the willingness of all respondents involved in the study. Forewarned to expect questionnaire return rates close to thirty percent, I contacted each respondent, either personally or telephonically, prior to delivering the questionnaires. The result was a return rate in excess of one hundred percent; some respondents even made copies of the questionnaire and had fellow subject matter experts participate. The genuine desire and enthusiasm of all respondents reveals the high degree of importance the professional joint forces officer corps places on the study of the MEU (SOC), and further justifies the significance of this study.

Significance of Thesis

This thesis is significant because is provides a different method to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities. The analysis concept explained in this study is more important than the specific results reached regarding ranking the MEU (SOC) capabilities. The theory of analytically translating mostly qualitative subjects into quantitative output in order to provide useful information to senior officers who make decisions about the future of the MEU (SOC) program is in itself significant. I hope this study positively impacts future MEU (SOC) capabilities analyses.

Relationship to Previous Studies

There is no evidence to suggest that a similar type of study has been conducted to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities. Previous studies have either focused on a single evaluation criterion, or relied exclusively upon respondent information to formulate their conclusions.

Suggestions for Further Study

The basis of the multiple criteria decision-making model used was the selection of the evaluation criteria. The criteria selected were based upon the qualitative judgement of senior U.S. military officers who responded to a thesis survey. I would suggest future studies of this nature utilize a broader respondent population, to include general-grade officers, to select evaluation criteria.

A detailed comparison between the final results within each evaluation criteria was outside the scope of this study, but the data presented in this study could serve as the

basis for such analysis. I recommend further studies answer the following questions. Does training for MEU (SOC) capabilities correlate to the priorities set forth by the Theater CINCs? Is training for MEU (SOC) capabilities commensurate with the likelihood of actually executing MEU (SOC) capabilities in an operation?

I recommend a similar form of analysis be conducted by the other U.S. military services to determine the relative validity of their capabilities.

Summary

This study analyzed the twenty-nine capabilities of the MEU (SOC) by utilizing a multiple criteria decision-making model with the intent of prioritizing the capabilities based upon their validity relative to each other. The study did not seek to invalidate any of the MEU (SOC) capabilities or the traditional subjective process of evaluating MEU (SOC) capabilities. Rather, the intent of the study is to determine which capabilities had the highest and least relative validity, and offers an analytical approach to evaluate the MEU (SOC) capabilities which could be used in conjunction with the traditional subjective analysis conducted when the MEU (SOC) capabilities are periodically reviewed.

The MEU (SOC) program has served the nation well in the past. However, the task at hand is to ensure the MEU (SOC) program serves the nation well in the future. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated in his *Commandant's Planning Guidance* shortly after he assumed office in 1995:

While the Marine Corps will retain the capability to deploy MAGTFs tailored or specific missions of limited duration, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)), forged and tested in real-world contingencies, remains the benchmark forward operating Marine force. It is the "jewel" in our crisis response crown and must be kept ready, relevant, and capable. Nevertheless, we must continuously remain willing to take a hard look at both the MEU (SOC) and our overall amphibious requirements. We must preserve those elements of our current organization which have continuing relevance and quickly jettison those which do not. What serves us well today might not be what is needed for tomorrow.[1]

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[1]Charles C. Krulak, "The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance," *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1995): A-7.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS OF MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES

Airfield/Port Seizure (APS). The capability to secure an airfield, port, or other key facilities in order to support MAGTF missions, receive follow-on forces, or enable MPF operations.

Amphibious Assault (AA). The capability to establish a force on a hostile shore.

Amphibious Demonstration (AD). The capability to deceive the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him.

Amphibious Raid (AR). The capability to conduct a swift incursion into an objective in order to inflict loss or damage upon opposing forces, followed by a planned withdrawal. The amphibious raid provides the operational focus for the MEU (SOC).

Amphibious Withdrawal (AW). The capability to withdraw forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Counterintelligence Operations (CIO). The capability to conduct CIO and human intelligence operations that protect the MEU (SOC) against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion by developing and providing information the commander can use to undertake countermeasures to protect resources.

Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD). The MEU (SOC)'s ability to conduct/participate in CP WMD operations is limited primarily to the application of the other 28 MEU(SOC) capabilities.

Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment (FSP). The capability to plan, control and coordinate naval surface fire, air support and ground fire support for U.S. or designated allied/friendly forces.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). The capability to provide services such as medical and dental care, minor construction repair to civilian facilities, technical information briefings to indigenous people and authorities, humanitarian support to charitable and religious organizations, temporary assistance in the administration of a local government, and assistance to counter the devastation caused by a manmade or natural disaster.

In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR). The capability to conduct recovery operations in-extremis, by means of an emergency extraction of hostages. Emphasis is placed on employment of reconnaissance assets, isolation and containment of the crisis site,

preparation for an emergency assault, and preparation for a hand-off of the crisis site when/if national or theater assets arrive.

Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG). The capability to clandestinely establish and operate navigational, signal, and/or electronic devices for guiding helicopter and surface waves from a designated point to a specific landing zone or beach.

JTF Enabling Operations (JEO). The capability to temporarily provide organic resources, coordination, and command and control functions to any CJTF in order to expedite the smooth transition of the JTFHQ into the Area of Operations.

Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT). The capability to provide training and assistance to foreign military forces permitted by U.S. law, using approved programs of instruction concerning weapons, equipment, basic skills, and limited maintenance training.

Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO). The capability to conduct tactical air operations at austere locations, including short-field, unimproved runways.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The capability to conduct operations in densely populated and built-up urban areas that employ appropriate tactics, equipment, and supporting arms.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The capability to conduct a single or multiple-site NEO by protecting and evacuating non-combatants in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments.

Peace Operations (PO). The capability to conduct peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Peacekeeping. The capability to conduct military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peace Enforcement. The capability to apply military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S). The capability to clandestinely obtain specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic, operational, or tactical significance.

Reinforcement Operations (RO). The capability to reinforce U.S. (or designated allied/friendly) forces by helicopter and/or surface means.

Security Operations (SO). The capability to conduct security operations, in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments, to protect U.S. (or designated allied/friendly nation) property and noncombatants.

Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF). The capability to conduct seizure, recovery, and/or destruction of offshore gas and oil platforms (GOPLAT).

Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM). The capability to conduct clandestine seizure/recovery of personnel and/or sensitive items in a benign or hostile environment.

Show of Force Operations (SOFO). The capability to engage in show of force operations, to include amphibious demonstrations, presence of forces, or fly-overs in support of U.S. interests.

Signal Intelligence /Electronic Warfare (SI/EW). The capability to conduct tactical SIGINT, limited ground based EW, and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and analysis.

Sniping Operations (SNO). The capability to locate, identify, and engage targets with precision sniper fire, during daylight or at night, in urban and rural environments.

Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO). The capability to conduct specialized demolitions in support of other special operations.

Tactical Deception Operations (TDO). The capability to design and implement operations to mislead/deceive opposing forces through electronic means, feints, ruses, demonstrations or portrayals which cause the enemy to react or fail to react in a manner that assists in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP). The capability to conduct rescue or extraction, by surface or air, of downed aircraft and/or personnel, equipment, aircraft sanitization, and provide advanced trauma-life support in a benign or hostile environment.

Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS). The capability to conduct vessel boarding/seizure in support of Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) on an uncooperative, underway ship.

APPENDIX B

THESIS SURVEY TO IDENTIFY MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES
EVALUATION CRITERIA

3 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Select Senior U.S. Military Officers

SUBJ: Master of Military Art and Science Thesis Survey

1. You have been identified as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the field of mission and capability analysis, and therefore your response to the enclosed professional research survey is respectfully requested. My name is Major John K. Love USMC, and I am currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and am enrolled in the Masters in Military Arts and Science (MMAS) program. My thesis seeks to analyze each of the current 29 capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and answer the following question: ARE THE 29 PROPOSED CAPABILITIES OF THE MEU (SOC) VALID?

2. Problem Statement. When the Commandant of the Marine Corps implemented the MEU (SOC) program in 1985, he identified 18 missions and capabilities of the MEU (SOC) based on an internal assessment of how the MEU (SOC) could best meet the operational needs of the theater Commanders in Chiefs (CINC). Over the course of the past 12 years the missions and capabilities of the MEU (SOC) have been modified in an attempt to keep the MEU(SOC)s relevant. The most recent MEU(SOC) Review Conference, conducted in late 1995, analyzed the MEU (SOC) missions and capabilities and recommended a change to the Marine Corps Order (MCO) that sets forth policy regarding the MEU (SOC) program. The new draft order now gives the MEU (SOC) one overall mission and combines what were previously termed both missions and capabilities into a total of 29 capabilities. I feel that during this review process the Marine Corps could have used additional criteria to evaluate the MEU (SOC) capabilities in order to determine their validity.

3. Methodology. My intent is not to discredit or invalidate the process last used by the Marine Corps to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities, but rather to offer a different perspective based on an innovative form of analysis. I will answer my thesis question by utilizing a six-step multiple criteria decision making model that has been developed with the assistance of a model development expert at the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC). The first step in creating a valid multiple criteria decision making model is to determine the evaluation criteria. This step is the basis of the framework of my model, and therefore must be accepted as valid by the reader of my thesis. Selection of evaluation criteria is subjective

and therefore must be made by the qualitative judgement of SMEs, such as you. The results of the enclosed survey will be tabulated to form the criteria by which I will examine each MEU (SOC) capability is the subsequent steps in the model.

4. Survey. Please return the survey, in the enclosed envelope, at your earliest convenience. The results of the survey will be tabulated and reflected in the thesis in summary form. There will be no attribution to any of your comments, so please be undauntedly honest and blunt.

5. Thank you in advance for your time. I appreciate your assistance in furthering this important academic endeavor.

J. K. LOVE

THESIS SURVEY: MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION CRITERIA

Part 1. Respondent Information.

NAME _____ SERVICE_____ RANK_____

Joint Duty Experience:_____

May I contact you to discuss the results of your survey? Y / N Phone #_____

Part 2. Assessment of evaluation criteria. For the purpose of this survey, the evaluation criteria are defined as, "the factors that should be considered when analyzing the validity of MEU (SOC) capabilities". Analyze the evaluation criteria listed below and place on "X" in the appropriate box. The "Categories of Importance" are how these criteria compare to each other in terms of overall importance. Omit criteria you feel are not relevant. **PLEASE MARK AN EQUAL NUMBER OF CRITERIA IN EACH CATEGORY OF IMPORTANCE.**

MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION CRITERIA	Category of Importance		
	HIGH	MED	LOW
1. Theater CINC identifies as a needed capability to meet current operational requirements			
2. Theater CINC identifies as a needed capability to meet future operational requirements			
3. The service (USMC) identifies as a needed capability to meet current operational requirements			
4. The service (USMC) identifies as a needed capability to meet future operational requirements			
5. Supportable by the Marine Corps' combat development process (doctrine, resources, and training)			
6. Is a capability unique to the MEU (SOC) (no other service provides same capability)			
7. MEU (SOC)s have successfully performed this capability in a previous operations (proven capability)			
8. Expense. (Budget to train and equip MEU (SOC)s to perform this capability is proportional to other capabilities)			

Part 3. Additional evaluation criteria. Write in additional evaluation criteria you feel should be considered when analyzing the validity of MEU(SOC) capabilities, and categorize their importance.

MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION CRITERIA	Category of Importance		
	HIGH	MED	LOW

Part 4. Remarks:

APPENDIX C

RESULTS OF THESIS SURVEY TO IDENTIFY MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION CRITERIA AND RESPONDENT PROFILE

Table 26. Results of Thesis Survey to Identify MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria

MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria	Number of Responses in Each Category of Importance (Point subvalues)			Total Points	Rank
	HIGH (Value of 3)	MED (Value of 2)	LOW (Value of 1)		
1. Theater CINC identifies as a needed capability to meet current operational requirements	9 (27)	3 (6)	0	33	1
2. Theater CINC identifies as a needed capability to meet future operational requirements	5 (15)	7 (14)	0	29	2
3. The service (USMC) identifies as a needed capability to meet current operational requirements	5 (15)	4 (8)	3 (3)	26	4
4. The service (USMC) identifies as a needed capability to meet future operational requirements	4 (12)	6 (12)	2 (2)	26	4
5. Supportable by the Marine Corps' combat development process (doctrine, resources, and training)	2 (6)	4 (8)	6 (6)	20	5
6. Is a capability unique to the MEU (SOC) (no other service provides same capability)	7 (21)	1 (2)	4 (4)	27	3
7. MEU (SOC)s have successfully performed this capability in a previous operation during past eight years (proven capability)	3 (9)	2 (4)	7 (7)	20	5
8. Expense. (Budget to train and equip MEU (SOC)s to perform this capability is proportional to other capabilities)	4 (12)	6 (12)	2 (2)	26	4

After reviewing the results of the survey, the five evaluation criteria listed in table 27 were selected and placed in the categories of importance as noted. Evaluation Criterion 4 below, "The capability requires training time commensurate with other MEU (SOC) capabilities," was selected in lieu of criterion 8 from the survey, "Expense (Budget to train and equip MEU (SOC)s to perform this capability is proportional to other capabilities)," in order to limit the criterion within the scope of available research. Criterion 5 from the survey, "Supportable by the Marine Corps' combat development process (doctrine, resources, and training)," was not included in the final selection of evaluation due to the impracticability of conducting research within this criterion.

Table 27. Analysis of Results of Thesis Survey to Identify MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria

Criterion Number	Evaluation Criteria	Category of Importance
1	The Theater CINCs identify the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet their operational requirements	High
2	The Marine Corps identifies the MEU (SOC) capability as needed to meet Theater CINC's operational requirements	Medium
3	The capability is unique to the MEU (SOC)	Medium
4	The capability requires training time commensurate with other MEU (SOC) capabilities	Medium
5	The capability has been executed by a MEU (SOC) during an operation in the past eight years	Low

Table 28. Respondent Profile for Thesis Survey to Identify MEU (SOC) Capabilities Evaluation Criteria

Total Number of Respondents	Branch of Service	Rank		Prior Joint Duty	
		O-5	O-6	YES	NO
3	US ARMY	1	2	3	0
3	US NAVY	1	2	2	1
3	US MARINES	1	2	2	1
3	US AIR FORCE	2	1	3	0
Total: 12		Total: 5	Total: 7	Total: 10	Total: 2

APPENDIX D

QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE PRIORITIES OF
THEATER UNIFIED COMMANDS

Dear Sir:

It was a pleasure talking with you on the telephone today.

As I stated, I am currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and am enrolled in the Master OF Military Art and Science (MMAS) program. My thesis seeks to analyze each of the 29 capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and answer the following question: ARE THE 29 CAPABILITIES OF THE MEU (SOC) VALID?

My intent is not to discredit or invalidate the process used by the Marine Corps to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities, but rather to offer a different perspective based on an innovative form of analysis. I will answer my thesis question by utilizing a multiple-criteria decision-making model that has been developed with the assistance of a model development expert at the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC). The first step in this process was to identify the criteria to be used to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities. This was accomplished by surveying a group of 12 senior officers from all branches of the U.S. military who were identified as subject matter experts in the area of capability analysis. Of the criteria selected, the one determined to be the most important is based on the needs of the Theater Commander in Chief (CINC). Specifically, in order for a MEU (SOC) capability to be considered as valid, it should be **identified by the Theater CINC as a needed capability to meet his operational requirements.**

The questionnaire found in enclosure (1) is intended to determine which MEU (SOC) capabilities are considered significant by CINCCENT in meeting his operational requirements. The definitions in enclosure (2) provide amplification of the MEU (SOC) capabilities. Please return the completed questionnaire, in the enclosed envelope, at your earliest convenience.

Thank you in advance for your assistance in furthering this important academic endeavor.

Respectfully,

J. K. LOVE
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Enclosures: 1. Thesis Questionnaire
2. MEU (SOC) Capabilities Definitions

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE: MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION

Please return the following two pages in the envelope provided.

Part 1. Respondent Information.

NAME _____ SERVICE_____ RANK_____

Current Assignment:_____

Part 2. Questionnaire. The table below provides a list of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities. Please analyze each of the capabilities with respect to **their significance in meeting the Theater CINC's operational requirements**, and place an "X" in the corresponding box. The "Categories of Relative Significance" are how these capabilities compare to each other in terms of overall significance.

Twenty-nine Capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)	Categories of Relative Significance				
	EXTREME	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	LEAST
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS					
1. Amphibious Assault					
2. Amphibious Raid					
3. Amphibious Demonstration					
4. Amphibious Withdrawal					
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS					
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery					
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities					
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (Maritime)					
8. Specialized Demolition Operations					
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel					
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material					
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction					

Twenty-nine Capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)	Categories of Relative Significance				
	EXTREME	HIGH	MODERATE	LOW	LEAST
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR					
12. Peace Operations (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement)					
13. Security Operations					
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations					
15. Reinforcement Operations					
16. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team					
17. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief					
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS					
18. Tactical Deception Operations					
19. Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment					
20. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare					
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain					
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance					
23. Initial Terminal Guidance					
24. Counterintelligence Operations					
25. Airfield/Port Seizure					
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations					
27. Show of Force Operations					
28. JTF Enabling Operations					
29. Sniping Operations					

Part 3. Remarks (including additional capabilities needed but not listed above).

_____

_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX E

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE PRIORITIES OF THEATER UNIFIED COMMANDS AND RESPONDENT PROFILE

Table 29. Respondent Profile for Questionnaire to Determine Priorities of Theater Unified Commands

Theater Command	Respondent's Position	Respondent's Branch of Service	Respondent's Rank
US Southern Command	Deputy Director of Operations	USMC	Colonel (O-6)
US Central Command	Acting Deputy J-3	USMC	Colonel (O-6)
US Atlantic Command	Deputy Chief, Current Operations (J-33)	USMC	Colonel (O-6)
US Pacific Command	Deputy J-3	USN	Captain (O-6)
US European Command	Current Operations Officer	USMC	Colonel (O-6)

The following point scale was established to determine "Final Categories of Relative Significance" in table 30.

1. Capabilities with a total point value between nineteen and twenty were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between sixteen and eighteen were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between thirteen and fifteen were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between ten and twelve were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between eight and ten were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance."

Table 30. Results of Questionnaire to Determine Priorities of Theater Unified Commands

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Number of responses in each "Category of Relative Significance" (Point subvalues)					Total Points	Final "Category of Relative Significance"
	Extr (Value of 4)	High (Value of 3)	Mod (Value of 2)	Low (Value of 1)	Least (Value of 0)		
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS							
1. AA	3 (12)	0 (0)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
2. AR	2 (8)	1 (3)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	15	Moderate
3. AD	2 (8)	2 (6)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
4. AW	2 (8)	0 (0)	2 (4)	1 (1)	0 (0)	13	Moderate
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS							
5. IHR	2 (8)	0 (0)	1 (2)	2 (2)	0 (0)	12	Low
6. SOEF	2 (8)	1 (3)	1 (2)	0 (0)	1 (0)	13	Moderate
7. VBSS	2 (8)	2 (6)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
8. SDO	0 (0)	2 (6)	2 (4)	1 (1)	0 (0)	11	Low
9. TRAP	3 (12)	2 (6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	18	High
10. SSPM	1 (4)	3 (9)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	14	Moderate
11. CPWMD	0 (0)	2 (6)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1 (0)	8	Least
MOOTW							
12. PO	2 (8)	2 (6)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
13. SO	4 (16)	1 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	19	Extreme
14. NEO	5 (20)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	20	Extreme

Table 30 (Continued). Results of Questionnaire to Determine Priorities of Theater Unified Commands

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Number of responses in each "Category of Relative Significance" (Point sub-values)					Total Points	Final "Category of Relative Significance"
	Extr (Value of 4)	High (Value of 3)	Mod (Value of 2)	Low (Value of 1)	Least (Value of 0)		
MOOTW Cont'd							
15. RO	2 (8)	2 (6)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
16. JTT	1 (4)	1 (3)	2 (4)	1 (1)	0 (0)	12	Low
17. HA/DR	4 (16)	0 (0)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	18	High
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS							
18. TDO	1 (4)	2 (6)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	14	Moderate
19. FSP	0 (0)	3 (9)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	13	Moderate
20. SI/EW	0 (0)	1 (3)	3 (6)	1 (1)	0 (0)	10	Low
21. MOUT	2 (8)	3 (9)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	17	High
22. R&S	2 (8)	1 (3)	2 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	15	Moderate
23. ITG	2 (8)	1 (3)	1 (2)	1 (1)	0 (0)	14	Moderate
24. CIO	1 (4)	2 (6)	1 (2)	1 (1)	0 (0)	13	Moderate
25. APS	3 (12)	1 (3)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	17	High
26. EAO	0 (0)	2 (6)	2 (4)	1 (1)	0 (0)	11	Low
27. SOFO	2 (8)	2 (6)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	High
28. JEO	3 (12)	2 (6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	18	High
29. SNO	0 (0)	1 (3)	2 (4)	2 (2)	0 (0)	9	Least

APPENDIX F

QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE UNIQUENESS OF
MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES

Dear Sir:

You have been identified as a subject matter expert in the field of U.S. Army Ranger capabilities, and therefore your response to the enclosed professional research questionnaire is respectfully requested. My name is Major John K. Love USMC, and I am currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and am enrolled in the Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) program. My thesis seeks to analyze each of the current 29 capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and answer the following question: ARE THE 29 CAPABILITIES OF THE MEU(SOC) VALID?

My intent is not to discredit or invalidate the process used by the Marine Corps to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities, but rather to offer a different perspective based on an innovative form of analysis. I will answer my thesis question by utilizing a multiple-criteria decision-making model that has been developed with the assistance of a model development expert at the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC). The first step in this process was to identify the criteria to be used to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities. This was accomplished by surveying a group of 12 senior officers from all branches of the U.S. military who were identified as subject matter experts in the area of capability analysis. Once the surveys were received and tabulated, five evaluation criteria were selected: Theater CINC requirements, USMC requirements, uniqueness, training requirements, and historical usage. I have contacted you in an attempt to conduct research exclusively within the criterion of, "***Uniqueness of MEU (SOC) capabilities***", which includes identifying other U.S. military units which are capable of performing the same capabilities.

The questionnaire in Enclosure (1) is intended to determine which of the MEU (SOC) capabilities can be performed by **U.S. Army Ranger units.** The definitions of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities are found in Enclosure (2).

Thank you in advance for your assistance in furthering this important academic endeavor.

Respectfully,

J. K. LOVE
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Enclosures: 1. Questionnaire
2. Definitions of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MAJOR J. K. LOVE, USMC

Please detach the cover letter and return the following two pages in the envelope provided.

NAME:_____ RANK:_____ SERVICE:_____

Prior U.S. Army Ranger experience:_____

_____

Please review each MEU (SOC) capability and place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether **U.S. Army Rangers** are tasked, and train, to conduct that capability. If the Rangers can execute the capability in a manner inconsistent with the definition of the MEU (SOC) capability or if there are certain conditions necessary for execution, please comment as required.

Twenty-nine Capabilities of the MEU (SOC)	Can US Army Rangers execute?		Conditions, limitations, or deviations necessary to execute the capability
	Y	N	
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS			
1. Amphibious Assault			
2. Amphibious Raid			
3. Amphibious Demonstration			
4. Amphibious Withdrawal			
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS			
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery			
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities			
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (Maritime)			
8. Specialized Demolition Operations			
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel			

Twenty-nine Capabilities of the MEU (SOC)	Rangers Execute?		Conditions, limitations, or deviations necessary to execute the capability
	Y	N	
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material			
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction			
MOOTW			
12. Peace Ops (Peacekeeping / Peace Enforcement)			
13. Security Operations			
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations			
15. Reinforcement Operations			
16. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team			
17. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief			
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS			
18. Tactical Deception Operations			
19. Fire Support Planning, Coord, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environm't			
20. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare			
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain			
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance			
23. Initial Terminal Guidance			
24. Counterintelligence Operations			
25. Airfield/Port Seizure			
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations			
27. Show of Force Operations			
28. JTF Enabling Operations			
29. Sniping Operations			

APPENDIX G

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE
UNIQUENESS OF MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES
AND RESPONDENT PROFILE

Table 31. Respondent Profile for Questionnaire to Determine Uniqueness of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Service	Type Unit	Rank	Previous Experience
US Army	Special Forces (SF)	O-6	SF "A" Team leader. SF Company CO. IG special warfare school. SF Battalion XO. J33 Special Ops Division, Joint Staff. SF Battalion CO. Selected as SF group CO.
		O-5	SF "A" Team Leader. SF Company CO. SF Battalion XO. SF Battalion CO.
		O-5	SF "A" Team Leader. SF Company CO. SF Battalion XO. SF Battalion CO.
		O-5	SF "A" Team Leader. SF Company CO. SF Battalion XO.
	Rangers	O-5	Ranger Platoon Leader, Company Co, S-3A, Battalion LNO, Senior LNO, Battalion S-3, and Battalion XO. Battalion Command Slated.
		O-4	Ranger Battalion S-1, Company CO and LNO.
	Airborne (ABN)	O-6	ABN Company CO, ABN Battalion CO
	Air Assault (AA)	O-5	AA Battalion S-3. AA Battalion XO. AA Battalion CO.
US Navy	Conventional	O-5	Operations Officer or XO on four surface vessels
	Special warfare	O-4	SEAL for 11 years
USAF	Special Tactics (ST)	O-4	ST Det CO, ST Team Leader, ST Squadron S-3
USMC	Air Contingency Forces (ACF)	O-4	ACF Company CO, ACF Battalion S-3
SOCOM	SMU	O-5	USMC Force Recon Company CO, J-3 USSOCOM

Table 32 depicts the results of the questionnaire for criterion 3. Units that could execute the capability per the definitions in appendix A received a full value of "one." In instances where units could only partially execute the capability per the definitions, or where certain conditions, limitations, or deviations were required for execution, a value of "½" was assigned. The following scale was used to determine the "Final Categories of Relative Significance:"

Total Point Value	"Final Category of Relative Significance"
0-1	Extreme Relative Significance (E)
2-3	High Relative Significance (H)
4-5	Moderate Relative Significance (M)
6-7	Low Relative Significance (L)
8-10	Least Relative Significance (N)

Table 32. Results of Questionnaire to Determine Uniqueness of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	SF	RANGR	ABN	AASLT	SEALs	USN	ST	ACF	SMU	**TOTAL**	Final Cat
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS											
1. Amphibious Assault (AA)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	E
2. Amphibious Raid (AR)	½	½	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	**4**	M
3. Amphibious Demonstration (AD)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**1**	E
4. Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	**1**	E
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS											
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	**3**	H
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	**2**	H
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (Maritime) (VBSS)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	**2**	H
8. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO)	1	1	0	0	1	0	½	0	1	**4 ½**	M
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	½	½	0	½	½	½	½	0	½	**3 ½**	H

Table 32 (Continued). Results of Questionnaire to Determine Uniqueness of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	SF	RANGR	ABN	AASLT	SEALs	USN	ST	ACF	SMU	**TOTAL**	Final Cat
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS CONT'D											
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material (SSPM)	1	1	0	1	1	0	½	0	1	**5 ½**	M
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD)	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	**3**	H
MOOTW											
12. Peace Operations (PO)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	**5**	M
13. Security Operations (SO)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	**5**	M
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	1	1	1	1	0	½	0	1	0	**5 ½**	M
15. Reinforcement Operations (RO)	0	1	1	1	0	½	0	1	0	**4 ½**	M
16. Joint/Combined Training / Instruction Team (JTT)	1	1	1	1	1	0	½	1	0	**6 ½**	L
17. Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	**5**	M
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS											
18. Tactical Deception Operations (TDO)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	**7**	L
19. Fire Support Planning, Coordination...(FSP)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	**1**	N
20. Signal Intelligence / Electronic Warfare (SI/EW)	1	½	1	½	½	1	0	½	0	**5**	M
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	**8**	N
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	**8**	N
23. Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	**6**	L
24. Counterintelligence Operations (CIO)	1	½	1	0	½	0	0	½	0	**3 ½**	H

Table 32 (Continued). Results of Questionnaire to Determine Uniqueness of MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	SF	RANGR	ABN	AASLT	SEALs	USN	ST	ACF	SMU	**TOTAL**	Final Cat
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS CONT'D											
25. Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	½	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	**3 ½**	H
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	**7**	L
27. Show of Force Operations (SOFO)	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	**5**	M
28. JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	**5**	M
29. Sniping Operations (SNO)	1	1	1	1	1	0	½	1	1	**7 ½**	L

Legend:

AASLT: U.S. Army Air Assault Units
ABN: U.S. Army Airborne Units
ACF: U.S. Marine Corps Air Contingency Forces
RANG: U.S. Army Rangers
SEALs: U.S. Navy Sea Air and Land Teams
SF: U.S. Army Special Forces
SMU: USSOCOM Special Mission Units
ST: U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Teams
USN: U.S. Navy Conventional Units (ships/crew)

APPENDIX H

QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
FOR MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES

Dear Sir:

It was a pleasure talking with you on the telephone today.

As I stated, I am a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and am enrolled in the Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) program. My thesis seeks to analyze each of the 29 capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and answer the following question: ARE THE 29 CAPABILITIES OF THE MEU (SOC) VALID? I have contacted you because you are considered to be a subject matter expert in the area of MEU (SOC)s, and specifically MEU (SOC) training.

My intent is not to discredit or invalidate the process used by the Marine Corps to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities, but rather to offer a different perspective based on an innovative form of analysis. I will answer my thesis question by utilizing a multiple-criteria decision-making model that has been developed with the assistance of a model development expert at the Study and Analysis Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Analysis Command (TRAC). The first step in this process was to identify the criteria to be used to analyze the MEU (SOC) capabilities. This was accomplished by surveying a group of 12 senior officers from all branches of the U.S. military who were identified as subject matter experts in the area of capability analysis. Once the surveys were received and tabulated, five evaluation criteria were selected: Theater CINC requirements, USMC requirements, uniqueness, **training requirements**, and historical usage. I have contacted you in an attempt to conduct research exclusively within the criterion of MEU (SOC) capabilities training requirements.

Within this criterion, my aim is to capture the **relative** overall training time spent by the entire MEU preparing for each of the 29 capabilities during the MEU predeployment training program. By seeking relative training time, I plan to compare the training time for each capability against the training time spent for all other capabilities, rather than trying to determine training hours or days for each capability. The model I have developed utilizes a "simple additive weighting" method to assign numerical values to the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities within each criterion; therefore, it is necessary to establish separate "categories of training time" for purposes of value weighting.

The enclosed questionnaire is intended to determine relative training time for each of the MEU (SOC) capabilities. In the table below, I define the five "categories of training time" that are used on the questionnaire. Please consider that these categories are only my attempt to help you ***compare the MEU (SOC) capabilities against each other*** in terms of training time.

Category of Relative Training Time	**Definition**		
Least	0% overall training time	**OR**	This capability is generalized from training for one of the other capabilities
Low	0-5% overall training time	**OR**	This capability requires less training time than average
Moderate	5-10% overall training time	**OR**	This capability requires the average amount of training time
High	10-15% overall training time	**OR**	This capability requires more training time than average
Extreme	> 15% overall training time	**OR**	This capability requires the most training time

My intent is not to ask you to conduct any detailed research or analysis, but rather to complete the enclosed questionnaire expeditiously based on your instinct and qualitative judgement as a subject matter expert. Please return the completed questionnaire, in the enclosed envelope, by 31 January 1998 so that your response can be tabulated and included in the analysis portion of my thesis, which is due in early February. The results of the questionnaire will be tabulated and reflected in the thesis in summary form. There will be no attribution to any of your comments, so please be undauntedly honest and blunt. A similar survey is being sent to several other field grade officers who hold similar billets at the component, MEF, SOTG and MEU levels.

Thank you in advance for your assistance in furthering this important academic endeavor.

Respectfully,

J. K. LOVE
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Enclosure 1: Thesis Questionnaire

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE: MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES EVALUATION

Part 1. Respondent Information.

Name (Voluntary)_____ Rank_____

Current Assignment_____

Part 2. Questionnaire. The table below provides a list of the 29 MEU (SOC) capabilities. Please analyze each of the capabilities with respect to their relative training time, and place an "X" in the corresponding box. Please refer to the definitions of the "**Categories of Relative Training Time**."

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Categories of Relative Training Time				
	LEAST	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS					
1. Amphibious Assault					
2. Amphibious Raid					
3. Amphibious Demonstration					
4. Amphibious Withdrawal					
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS					
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery					
6. Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities					
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (Maritime)					
8. Specialized Demolition Operations					
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel					
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material					
11. Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction					
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR					
12. Peace Operations (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement)					
13. Security Operations					
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations					
15. Reinforcement Operations					
16. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team					
17. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief					

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Categories of Relative Training Time				
	LEAST	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS					
18. Tactical Deception Operations					
19. Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment					
20. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare					
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain					
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance					
23. Initial Terminal Guidance					
24. Counterintelligence Operations					
25. Airfield/Port Seizure					
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations					
27. Show of Force Operations					
28. JTF Enabling Operations					
29. Sniping Operations					

Part 3. Remarks:

APPENDIX I

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES AND RESPONDENT PROFILE

Table 33. Respondent Profile For Questionnaire to Determine Training Requirements For MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Number	Rank	Unit	Billet
1	O-5	MARFORLANT	MEU Action Officer
2	O-5	MARFORPAC	MEU Action Officer
3	O-5	I MEF	G-7
4	O-5	I MEF	SOTG S-3
5	O-4	I MEF	SOTG
6	O-5	II MEF G-3	MEU Action Officer
7	O-4	II MEF	SOTG S-3
8	E-8	II MEF	SOTG SNCOIC
9	O-5	III MEF	SOTG Operations Officer
10	O-5	III MEF	SOTG Deputy Director

The following point scale was established to determine "Final Categories of Relative Significance" in table 34.

1. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-eight and thirty-three were placed in a final category of "Extreme Relative Significance."

2. Capabilities with a total point value between twenty-two and twenty-seven were placed in a final category of "High Relative Significance."

3. Capabilities with a total point value between sixteen and twenty-one were placed in a final category of "Moderate Relative Significance."

4. Capabilities with a total point value between ten and fifteen were placed in a final category of "Low Relative Significance."

5. Capabilities with a total point value between four and nine were placed in a final category of "Least Relative Significance."

Table 34. Results of Questionnaire to Determine Training Requirements for MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Number of responses in each "Category of Relative Training Time" (Point subvalues)					Total points	Final "Category of Relative Significance"
	Least (Value of 4)	Low (Value of 3)	Mod (Value of 2)	High (Value of 1)	Ext (Value of 0)		
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS							
1. AA	0 (0)	1 (3)	9 (18)	0 (0)	0 (0)	21	Moderate
2. AR	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	5 (5)	5 (0)	5	Least
3. AD	2 (8)	8 (24)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	32	Extreme
4. AW	1 (4)	5 (15)	3 (6)	1 (1)	0 (0)	26	High
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS							
5. IHR	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (4)	6 (0)	4	Least
6. SOEF	3 (12)	4 (12)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1 (0)	26	High
7. VBSS	0 (0)	1 (3)	4 (8)	4 (4)	1 (0)	15	Low
8. SDO	0 (0)	3 (9)	4 (8)	3 (3)	0 (0)	20	Moderate
9. TRAP	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (4)	8 (8)	0 (0)	12	Low
10. SSPM	1 (4)	0 (0)	1 (2)	7 (7)	1 (0)	13	Low
11. CPWMD	4 (16)	2 (6)	3 (6)	0 (0)	1 (0)	28	Extreme
MOOTW							
12. PO	2 (8)	2 (6)	6 (12)	0 (0)	0 (0)	16	Moderate
13. SO	1 (4)	1 (3)	6 (12)	2 (2)	0 (0)	21	Moderate
14. NEO	0 (0)	0 (0)	5 (10)	4 (4)	1 (0)	14	Low

Table 34 (Continued). Results of Questionnaire to Determine Training Requirements for MEU (SOC) Capabilities

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Number of responses in each "Category of Relative Training Time" (Point sub-values)					Total points	Final "Category of Relative Significance"
	Least (Value of 4)	Low (Value of 3)	Mod (Value of 2)	High (Value of 1)	Ext (Value of 0)		
MOOTW Cont'd							
15. RO	1 (4)	3 (9)	5 (10)	1 (1)	0 (0)	24	High
16. JTT	4 (16)	5 (15)	1 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	33	Extreme
17. HA/DR	1 (4)	2 (6)	4 (8)	3 (3)	0 (0)	21	Moderate
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS							
18. TDO	2 (8)	5 (15)	3 (6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	29	High
19. FSP	0 (0)	4 (12)	4 (8)	1 (1)	1 (0)	21	Moderate
20. SI/EW	1 (4)	3 (9)	3 (6)	3 (3)	0 (0)	22	High
21. MOUT	0 (0)	4 (12)	4 (8)	2 (2)	0 (0)	22	High
22. R&S	2 (8)	1 (3)	2 (4)	3 (3)	2 (0)	18	Moderate
23. ITG	1 (4)	3 (9)	3 (6)	3 (3)	0 (0)	22	High
24. CIO	1 (4)	2 (6)	6 (12)	1 (1)	0 (0)	23	High
25. APS	1 (4)	2 (6)	7 (14)	0 (0)	0 (0)	24	High
26. EAO	1 (4)	2 (6)	6 (12)	1 (1)	0 (0)	23	High
27. SOFO	3 (12)	3 (9)	4 (8)	0 (0)	0 (0)	29	Extreme
28. JEO	3 (12)	3 (9)	1 (2)	3 (3)	0 (0)	26	High
29. SNO	0 (0)	5 (15)	2 (4)	3 (3)	0 (0)	22	High

APPENDIX J

MEU (SOC) CAPABILITIES CONDUCTED IN NAMED OPERATIONS DURING THE PAST EIGHT YEARS

Table 35. MEU (SOC) Capabilities Conducted in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Ref #	1	2	3	4	5
Named Operation (Dates)	SHARP EDGE (5/90-1/91)	DESERT SHIELD / STORM (8/90-5/91)	PROVIDE COMFORT (4-7/91)	FIERY VIGIL (6/91)	HOT ROCK (4/92)
Location	Liberia	Southwest Asia	Turkey / N Iraq	Philippines	Italy
MEU(s)	22d, & 26th	11th, 13th	24th	15th	24th
Mission	NEO	PO	HA	HA/DR	HA/DR
1. AA	N	N	N	N	N
2. AR	N	Y	N	N	N
3. AD	N	Y	N	N	N
4. AW	N	N	N	N	N
5. IHR	N	N	N	N	N
6. SOEF	N	N	N	N	N
7. VBSS	N	Y	N	N	N
8. SDO	N	N	N	N	N
9. TRAP	N	N	N	N	N
10. SSPM	N	N	N	N	N
11. CPWMD	N	N	N	N	N
12. PO	N	Y	Y	N	N
13. SO	Y	N	Y	N	N
14. NEO	Y	N	N	Y	N
15. RO	Y	Y	N	N	N
16. JTT	N	Y	N	N	N
17. HA/DR	N	N	Y	Y	Y
18. TDO	N	Y	N	N	N
19. FSP	Y	Y	Y	N	N
20. SI/EW	Y	Y	Y	N	N
21. MOUT	Y	N	Y	N	N
22. R&S	N	Y	Y	N	N
23. ITG	Y	N	Y	N	N
24. CIO	Y	Y	Y	N	N
25. APS	N	N	Y	N	N
26. EAO	N	Y	Y	N	N
27. SOFO	Y	Y	Y	N	N
28. JEO	N	N	Y	N	N
29. SNO	Y	N	N	N	N

Table 35 (Continued). MEU (SOC) Capabilities Conducted in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Ref #	6	7	8	9
Named Operation (Dates)	SHARP GUARD, PROVIDE PROMISE, DENY FLIGHT, JOIND ENDEAVOR, (6/92- 12/96)	IMPRES-SIVE LIFT (9-10/92)	RESTORE / CONTIN-UED HOPE (12/92–3/94)	SUPPORT DEMO-CRACY (9/93-9/94)
Location	Adriatic Sea, Bosnia-Herz	Somalia	Somalia	Haiti
MEU(s) Involved	22d, 24th, & 26th	11th	11th, 13th, 15th, 22d, 24th, 26th	24th
Primary Mission	Enforce UN Sanctions, HA	PO	PO	Enforce UN sanctions
AMPHIB	NA	NA	NA	NA
1. AA	N	N	Y	N
2. AR	N	N	Y	N
3. AD	N	N	N	N
4. AW	N	N	N	N
DA OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA
5. IHR	N	N	N	N
6. SOEF	N	N	N	N
7. VBSS	Y	N	N	N
8. SDO	N	N	Y	N
9. TRAP	Y	N	Y	N
10. SSPM	N	N	Y	N
11. CPWMD	N	N	N	N
MOOTW	NA	NA	NA	NA
12. PO	Y	Y	Y	N
13. SO	N	Y	Y	N
14. NEO	N	N	N	N
15. RO	N	Y	Y	N
16. JTT	N	N	N	N
17. HA/DR	Y	N	Y	N
SUPT. OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA
18. TDO	N	N	N	N
19. FSP	Y	N	Y	N
20. SI/EW	Y	N	Y	N
21. MOUT	N	N	Y	N
22. R&S	N	N	Y	N
23. ITG	N	N	Y	N
24. CIO	N	N	Y	N
25. APS	N	N	Y	N
26. EAO	N	N	Y	N
27. SOFO	Y	N	Y	Y
28. JEO	N	N	N	N
29. SNO	N	N	Y	N

Table 35 (Continued). MEU (SOC) Capabilities Conducted in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Ref #	10	11	12	13	14
Named Operation (Dates)	DISTANT RUNNER (4/94)	SUPPORT HOPE (8-11/94)	UNITED SHIELD (1-3/95)	VIGILANT SENTINEL (8/95-2/96)	ASSURED RESPONSE (4-8/96)
Location	Rwanda	Rwanda / Uganda	Somalia	SWA	Liberia
MEU(s) Involved	11th	15th	13th	11TH	22d
Primary Mission	NEO	HA	UNOSOM WD	SOFO	NEO
AMPHIB	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1. AA	N	N	Y	N	N
2. AR	N	N	N	N	N
3. AD	N	N	N	N	N
4. AW	N	N	Y	N	N
DA OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5. IHR	N	N	N	N	N
6. SOEF	N	N	N	N	N
7. VBSS	N	N	N	N	N
8. SDO	N	N	N	N	N
9. TRAP	N	N	N	N	N
10. SSPM	N	N	N	N	N
11. CPWMD	N	N	N	N	N
MOOTW	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
12. PO	N	N	Y	N	N
13. SO	Y	N	Y	N	Y
14. NEO	Y	N	N	N	Y
15. RO	N	N	Y	N	Y
16. JTT	N	N	N	N	N
17. HA/DR	N	Y	N	N	N
SUPT. OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
18. TDO	N	N	N	N	N
19. FSP	N	N	Y	N	Y
20. SI/EW	N	N	Y	N	Y
21. MOUT	N	N	Y	N	Y
22. R&S	N	N	Y	N	N
23. ITG	N	N	Y	N	N
24. CIO	N	N	Y	N	Y
25. APS	N	N	N	N	N
26. EAO	N	N	N	N	N
27. SOFO	N	N	Y	Y	N
28. JEO	N	N	N	N	Y
29. SNO	N	N	N	N	Y

Table 35 (Continued). MEU (SOC) Capabilities Conducted in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Ref #	15	16	17	18	19
Named Operation (Dates)	QUICK RESPONSE (5-8/96)	SILVER WAKE (3-7/97)	GUARDIAN RETRIE-VAL (2-5/97)	NOBLE OBELISK (5-6/97)	SILENT ASSUR-ANCE (11/97)
Location	Central African Rep	Albania	Zaire	Sierra Leone	Qatar
MEU(s) Involved	22d	26th, elems 22d	22d, 26th	22d	13th
Primary Mission	NEO	NEO	NEO	NEO	SO
AMPHIB	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1. AA	N	N	N	N	N
2. AR	N	N	N	N	N
3. AD	N	N	N	Y	N
4. AW	N	N	N	Y	N
DA OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5. IHR	N	N	N	N	N
6. SOEF	N	N	N	N	N
7. VBSS	N	N	N	N	N
8. SDO	N	N	N	N	N
9. TRAP	N	N	N	N	N
10. SSPM	N	N	N	N	N
11. CPWMD	N	N	N	N	N
MOOTW	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
12. PO	N	N	N	N	N
13. SO	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
14. NEO	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
15. RO	Y	Y	N	Y	N
16. JTT	N	N	N	N	N
17. HA/DR	N	N	N	N	N
SUPT. OPS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
18. TDO	N	N	N	N	N
19. FSP	N	Y	N	N	N
20. SI/EW	N	Y	N	Y	N
21. MOUT	Y	Y	N	N	N
22. R&S	N	N	N	N	N
23. ITG	N	N	N	N	N
24. CIO	Y	Y	N	Y	N
25. APS	Y	N	Y	N	N
26. EAO	N	N	Y	N	N
27. SOFO	N	Y	N	N	N
28. JEO	N	N	Y	N	N
29. SNO	N	N	N	N	N

Table 35 (Continued). MEU (SOC) Capabilities Conducted in Named Operations During the Past Eight Years

Twenty-nine MEU (SOC) Capabilities	Total Number of Times Capability Executed During Past Eight Years	Final Categories of Relative Significance
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS	NA	NA
1. Amphibious Assault (AA)	2	Low
2. Amphibious Raid (AR)	2	Low
3. Amphibious Demonstration (AD)	2	Low
4. Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)	2	Low
DIRECT ACTION OPERATIONS	NA	NA
5. In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	0	Least
6. Seizure/Recovery Offshore Energy Facilities (SOEF)	0	Least
7. Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Ops (VBSS)	2	Low
8. Specialized Demolition Operations (SDO)	1	Least
9. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	2	Low
10. Seizure/Recovery of Selected Pers/Material (SSPM)	1	Least
11. Counter-prolif of Wpns of Mass Destr (CPWMD)	0	Least
MOOTW	NA	NA
12. Peace Ops (Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement) (PO)	6	High
13. Security Operations (SO)	12	Extreme
14. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	8	Extreme
15. Reinforcement Operations (RO)	9	Extreme
16. Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team (JTT)	1	Least
17. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)	6	High
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS	NA	NA
18. Tactical Deception Operations (TDO)	1	Least
19. Fire Support Planning... (FSP)	8	Extreme
20. Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (SI/EW)	9	Extreme
21. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)	7	High
22. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)	4	Moderate
23. Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)	4	Moderate
24. Counterintelligence Operations (CIO)	9	Extreme
25. Airfield/Port Seizure (APS)	4	Moderate
26. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations (EAO)	4	Moderate
27. Show of Force Operations (SOFO)	9	Extreme
28. JTF Enabling Operations (JEO)	3	Low
29. Sniping Operations (SNO)	3	Low

APPENDIX K

FINAL MODEL COMPUTATIONS

Table 36. Final Subvalues for Each MEU (SOC) Capability Within Each Evaluation Criterion

Final Categories of Relative Significance	Categories of Importance				
	High Importance	Medium Importance			Low Importance
	Criterion 1 (Value of 3)	Criterion 2 (Value of 2)	Criterion 3 (Value of 2)	Criterion 4 (Value of 2)	Criterion 5 (Value of 1)
Extreme Relative Significant (Value of 4)	SO (12) NEO (12)	No capabilities in this category	AA (8) AD (8) AW (8)	AD (8) CPWMD (8) JTT (8) SOFO (8)	SO (4) NEO (4) RO (4) FSP (4) SI/EW (4) CIO (4) SOFO (4)
High Relative Significant (Value of 3)	AA (9) AD (9) VBSS (9) TRAP (9) PO (9) RO (9) HA/DR (9) MOUT (9) APS (9) SOFO (9) JEO (9)	No capabilities in this category	IHR (6) SOEF (6) VBSS (6) TRAP (6) CPWMD (6) CIO (6) APS (6)	AW (6) SOEF (6) RO (6) TDO (6) SI/EW (6) MOUT (6) ITG (6) CIO (6) APS (6) EAO (6) JEO (6) SNO (6)	PO (3) HA/DR (3) MOUT (3)
Moderate Relative Significance (Value of 2)	AR (6) AW (6) SOEF (6) SSPM (6) TDO (6) FSP (6) R&S (6) ITG (6) CIO (6)	All capabilities considered moderately significant (4)	AR (4) SDO (4) SSPM (4) PO (4) SO (4) NEO (4) RO (4) HA/DR (4) SI/EW (4) SOFO (4) JEO (4)	AA (4) SDO (4) PO (4) SO (4) HA/DR (4) FSP (4) R&S (4)	R&S (2) ITG (2) APS (2) EAO (2)

Table 36 (Continued). Final Subvalues for Each MEU (SOC) Capability Within Each Evaluation Criterion

Final Categories of Relative Significance	Categories of Importance				
	High Importance	Medium Importance			Low Importance
	Criterion 1 (Value of 3)	Criterion 2 (Value of 2)	Criterion 3 (Value of 2)	Criterion 4 (Value of 2)	Criterion 5 (Value of 1)
Low Relative Significance (Value of 1)	IHR (3) SDO (3) JTT (3) SI/EW (3) EAO (3)	No capabilities in this category	JTT (2) TDO (2) ITG (2) EAO (2) SNO (2)	VBSS (2) TRAP (2) SSPM (2) NEO (2)	AA (1) AR (1) AD (1) AW (1) VBSS (1) TRAP (1) JEO (1) SNO (1)
Least Relative Significance (Value of 0)	CPWMD(0) SNO (0)	No capabilities in this category	FSP (0) MOUT (0) R&S (0)	AR (0) IHR (0)	IHR (0) SOEF (0) SDO (0) SSPM (0) CPWMD(0) JTT(0) TDO (0)

Table 37. Final Point Values for Each MEU (SOC) Capability

MEU (SOC) Capability	Subvalues for Each Capability By Evaluation Criterion					Total Point Value
	Criterion 1	Criterion 2	Criterion 3	Criterion 4	Criterion 5	
AMPHIB OPS						
1. AA	9	4	8	4	1	26
2. AR	6	4	4	0	1	15
3. AD	9	4	8	8	1	30
4. AW	6	4	8	6	1	25
DIRECT ACTION OPS						
5. IHR	3	4	6	0	0	13
6. SOEF	6	4	6	6	0	22
7. VBSS	9	4	6	2	1	22
8. SDO	3	4	4	4	0	15
9. TRAP	9	4	6	2	1	22
10. SSPM	6	4	4	2	0	16
11. CPWMD	0	4	6	8	0	18
MOOTW						
12. PO	9	4	4	4	3	24
13. SO	12	4	4	4	4	28
14. NEO	12	4	4	2	4	26
15. RO	9	4	4	6	4	27
16. JTT	3	4	2	8	0	17
17. HA/DR	9	4	4	4	3	24
SUPPORT. OPS						
18. TDO	6	4	2	6	0	18
19. FSP	6	4	0	4	4	18
20. SI/EW	3	4	4	6	4	21
21. MOUT	9	4	0	6	3	22
22. R&S	6	4	0	4	2	16
23. ITG	6	4	2	6	2	20
24. CIO	6	4	6	6	4	26
25. APS	9	4	6	6	2	27
26. EAO	3	4	2	6	2	17
27. SOFO	6	4	4	8	4	26
28. JEO	9	4	4	6	1	24
29. SNO	0	4	2	6	1	13

APPENDIX L

ANALYSIS OF EACH MEU (SOC) CAPABILITY

Table 38. Analysis of Each MEU (SOC) Capability

MEU (SOC) Capability	Final Category of Significance Within Each MEU (SOC) Capability Evaluation Criterion					Final Category Relative Validity
	Criterion 1	Criterion 2	Criterion 3	Criterion 4	Criterion 5	
AMPHIB						
1. AA	High	Moderate	Extreme	Moderate	Low	High
2. AR	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Least	Low	Least
3. AD	High	Moderate	Extreme	Extreme	Low	Extreme
4. AW	Moderate	Moderate	Extreme	High	Low	High
DA OPS						
5. IHR	Low	Moderate	High	Least	Least	Least
6. SOEF	Moderate	Moderate	High	High	Least	Moderate
7. VBSS	High	Moderate	High	Low	Low	Moderate
8. SDO	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Least	Least
9. TRAP	High	Moderate	High	Low	Low	Moderate
10. SSPM	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Least	Low
11. CPWMD	Least	Moderate	High	Extreme	Least	Low
MOOTW						
12. PO	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
13. SO	Extreme	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Extreme	Extreme
14. NEO	Extreme	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Extreme	High
15. RO	High	Moderate	Moderate	High	Extreme	High
16. JTT	Low	Moderate	Low	Extreme	Least	Low
17. HA/DR	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
SPT OPS						
18. TDO	Moderate	Moderate	Low	High	Least	Low
19. FSP	Moderate	Moderate	Least	Moderate	Extreme	Low
20. SI/EW	Low	Moderate	Moderate	High	Extreme	Moderate
21. MOUT	High	Moderate	Least	High	High	Moderate
22. R&S	High	Moderate	Least	Moderate	Moderate	Low
23. ITG	Moderate	Moderate	Low	High	Moderate	Moderate
24. CIO	Moderate	Moderate	High	High	Extreme	High
25. APS	High	Moderate	High	High	Moderate	High
26. EAO	Low	Moderate	Low	High	Moderate	Low
27. SOFO	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Extreme	Extreme	High
28. JEO	High	Moderate	Moderate	High	Least	High
29. SNO	Least	Moderate	Low	High	Low	Least

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

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